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ABSTRACT 
Designing Incentives for Peer-to-Peer Systems 
by 
Seth James Nielson 
Peer-to-peer systems, networks of egalitarian nodes without a central authority, 
can achieve massive scalability and fault tolerance through the pooling together of 
individual resources. Unfortunately, most nodes represent self-interested, or ratio-
nal, parties that will attempt to maximize their consumption of shared resources 
while minimizing their own contributions. This constitutes a type of attack that can 
destabilize the system. 
The first contribution of this thesis is a proposed taxonomy for these rational 
attacks and the most common solutions used in contemporary designs to thwart 
them. One approach is to design the P2P system with incentives for cooperation, 
so that rational nodes voluntarily behave. We broadly classify these incentives as 
being either genuine or artificial, with the former describing incentives inherent in 
peer interactions, and the latter describing a secondary enforcement system. We 
observe that genuine incentives tend to be more robust to rational manipulations 
than artificial counterparts. 
Based on this observation, we also propose two extensions to BitTorrent, a P2P 
file distribution protocol. While this system is popular, accounting for approximately 
one-third of current Internet traffic, it has known limitations. Our extensions use 
genuine incentives to address some of these problems. 
The first extension improves seeding, an altruistic mode wherein nodes that have 
completed their download continue to provide upload service. We incentivize seeding 
by giving long-term identifiers to clients enabling seeding clients to be recognized 
and rewarded in subsequent downloads. Simulations demonstrate that our method is 
highly effective in protecting swarms from aggressive clients such as Bit Tyrant. 
Finally, we introduce The BitTorrent Anonymity Marketplace, wherein each peer 
simultaneously joins multiple swarms to disguise their true download intentions. Peers 
then trade one torrent for another, making the cover traffic valuable as a means of 
obtaining the real target. Thus, when a neighbor receives a request from a peer for 
blocks of a torrent, it does not know if the peer is really downloading that torrent, or 
only using it in trade. Using simulation, we demonstrate that nodes cannot determine 
peer intent from observed interactions. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The distinguishing feature of peer-to-peer (P2P) systems is the egalitarian responsi-
bilities of the participants. Each node that joins the system is expected to contribute 
as well as consume shared resources. When the peers cooperate, the whole system 
can outperform traditional client-server systems in terms of scalability, resiliency, and 
fault-tolerance. Unfortunately, because most of the participants are rational, or mo-
tivated solely by their own interests, cooperation is not the default behavior and, 
without a centralized authority, it cannot be easily enforced. Selfishness drives nodes 
to consume more than their fair share of resources or refuse to give expected contri-
butions. Behavior such as this, when contrary to system specifications, constitutes 
rational attacks, and these attacks can degrade performance or destabilize the system. 
To counter this threat, many P2P protocols are built around an incentives structure 
designed to make obedience the selfish choice because it is the only way to obtain 
maximum reward. 
This thesis investigates principles of incentive design that increase the robustness 
of P2P systems to rational attacks. In this introduction, we first provide background 
and motivation for this effort as well as a sketch of our contributions to the research 
landscape. Chapter 2 then proposes a taxonomy of rational attacks and evaluates 
various defensive design principles including incentives. We then apply the insights 
of this evaluation to guide the development of two extensions to BitTorrent. These 
extensions for improved performance and improved anonymity are described in Chap-
2 
ter 3 and Chapter 4 respectively. Chapter 5 subsequently presents our conclusions. 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Traditional client-server computing is based on a central node or nodes that control 
the operation of the overall system. Client nodes may connect to, contribute to, 
and participate with these central servers but the servers are in control, and clients 
participate as guests. While clients may be allowed to communicate with each other, 
such inter-client communications are routed through the central authority where they 
are subject to review, filtering, and modification. 
On the other hand, P2P systems [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] are built on an anti-
thetical concept of node equality and direct peer-to-peer communication. Eliminating 
the central authority has tremendous benefits. The most immediate of these is that 
there is no single point of failure that can bring down the entire system. Scalability 
is also improved because, in general, the P2P system aggregates resources from the 
participants so that capacity is more or less proportional to load. On the other hand, 
servers must generally maintain a fixed resource profile that either struggles with 
peak use or is over-provisioned for average demand. 
Despite these theoretical advantages, practical P2P systems completely deterio-
rate if and when participants refuse to cooperate. This so-called "free-riding" prob-
lem [11, 12, 13], is the general rule, unfortunately, because most nodes are rational, 
or utility-maximizing. Such nodes seek to maximize their own acquisition of shared 
resources while minimizing their own contributions. For example, consider a P2P sys-
tem designed for content streaming [14]. To decrease the upload bandwidth burden 
on the original source, only a small number of nodes directly contact it. The con-
tent is then propagated from these nodes to additional peers. This system can only 
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scale if nodes obey specification and pass on content to downstream neighbors. The 
self-interested node, however, may simply decide not to expend upload bandwidth 
altruistically and refuse to retransmit the stream. Assuming that rational nodes are 
a large portion of the P2P population, it is likely that the system will not function 
well, if at all. 
In most P2P systems, self-interested behavior at the expense of the system can 
be classified as a rational manipulation failure [15] or, from a different perspective, a 
rational attack. These attacks represent the primary and most fundamental challenge 
to P2P operations. 
However, system designers have a powerful point of leverage in dealing with ra-
tional nodes. Unlike traditional attackers operating with the intent to cause harm 
through theft or vandalism, rational attackers are motivated by the benefits and 
services of the system. In other words, harming the system is not their primary mo-
tivation, but only an unfortunate side-effect. Therefore, if the only way to maximize 
utility is through cooperation, these nodes will voluntarily alter their behavior. Thus, 
a system designed with proper incentives [16, 17, 18, 19, 20] can achieve obedience 
despite the lack of a centralized enforcement authority. This approach is drawn from 
models of game theory and mechanism design [21]. We note, for completeness, that 
other forms of attack still matter and have been investigated [22], but are beyond the 
scope of this work. 
Ideally, a P2P system should be perfectly faithful to the designer's specification. 
In such a system, a self-interested, utility-maximizing node "will follow the default 
strategy because... there is no other strategy that yields a higher utility for this 
node" [23]. When this ideal cannot be achieved, the practical goal is simply to make 
the system sufficiently robust for continued viability. Determining what incentives 
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should be used in a system and how they should be employed represent a significant 
challenge to designers, and an intriguing academic problem. 
One example of a P2P system that makes effective use of incentives is Bit Tor-
rent [1], a distributed download protocol that is popular in practice and research. 
The key incentive in the protocol is a tit-for-tat [24] exchange mechanism wherein 
peers trade different chunks of the file with each other. Peers reserve most of their 
upload bandwidth for rewarding their most generous neighbors. The remaining up-
load bandwidth is used to search for better partners by donating to other peers in the 
hope of being subsequently rewarded. While it has been shown that the Bit Torrent 
protocol can be exploited [25, 26, 27, 28, 29], it has been sufficiently robust against 
rational attackers for practical purposes [23]. In fact, various measures of BitTor-
rent traffic have estimated that the BitTorrent protocol accounts for approximately 
one-third of all Internet traffic [30, 31, 32]. 
Nevertheless, the BitTorrent protocol can still be improved. For example, it per-
mits nodes that have completed the download of the file to continue serving the 
swarm as a seed. BitTorrent requires at least one seed at all times or the other nodes 
cannot be guaranteed to complete the full download. In addition, seeds improve the 
overall performance of the swarm because they consume no resources, while still mak-
ing contributions. Despite their importance, however, the default protocol offers no 
incentives for this mode of operation and many nodes contribute little if any seeding. 
Another concern in the operation of BitTorrent is that of anonymity. BitTorrent 
itself was not designed to anonymize the participants in any way [1]. However, the 
design of the protocol is such that a node will expose its actions to potentially thou-
sands [33] of peers, creating a visibility footprint that many users are uncomfortable 
with. One method for dealing with this problem is to pass BitTorrent traffic through 
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Tor [34]. Tor is a P2P anonymity network that routes traffic through a series of 
internal nodes to disguise the point of origin. Measurements [35] have shown that 
BitTorrent traffic represents a significant drain on Tor resources. Unfortunately, the 
incentives for contributing bandwidth resources to Tor are not clear and this results in 
low contributions and poor scalability. In the interest of improving these conditions, 
a few BitTorrent specific anonymity solutions [36, 37, 38] have been proposed, but 
none of them make effective use of incentives for cooperation. 
1.2 Contribution 
In this research, we answer the following questions: 
1. What are the general principles of incentives design that produce 
effective peer cooperation? 
2. How can these principles be applied to BitTorrent's seeding opera-
tion? 
3. How can these principles be applied to the BitTorrent anonymity 
problem? 
The foundation of this research is our presentation of a taxonomy of rational at-
tacks and corresponding principles of system design for ameliorating them. We answer 
our first key question by demonstrating that incentives can be broken into genuine 
and artificial categories. Genuine incentives are built into the P2P operations directly 
while artificial incentives are superimposed as a correction to the core protocol. Gen-
uine incentives are generally more simple to understand and more robust to rational 
attacks. 
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Based on this principle of genuine incentives, our research then extends the BitTor-
rent protocol to incentivize the seeding operation. This extension modifies BitTorrent 
slightly to provide long term identifiers to participants. Nodes can then remember one 
another from one download to next. In this manner, nodes that seed in one swarm can 
be rewarded in later ones. Even though this extension requires a slight modification 
to the protocol, it can be implemented in a backwards compatible manner. 
Finally, we also apply genuine incentives to the BitTorrent anonymity prob-
lem. Our extension creates a BitTorrent-like system that we term The BitTorrent 
Anonymity Marketplace. Inside this system, peers participate in many downloads at 
the same time to obscure their actual intention. In other words, the most powerful 
observer cannot reduce their actual intended download any further than 1 in k, where 
k is the number of simultaneous downloads. The key incentives design is that nodes 
compute a value for the cover traffic torrents they are trading. Nodes request torrents 
that they believe will help them download the item they really want. When a node 
makes a request from its peer, the peer cannot tell if the node really wants it or if it 
simply believes it can be used in trade. This incentives system ensures that any tor-
rent in the Marketplace can be valuable to uninterested parties preventing starvation 
and strengthening anonymity. 
1.3 Thesis Organization 
This thesis is derived from three independent papers. 
Chapter 2 is primarily derived from our paper, "A Taxonomy of Rational Attacks" 
by the author, Scott Crosby, and Dan S. Wallach. This chapter lays out how various 
types of attacks are connected to one another, the weak points of a system they 
exploit, and system design principles that improve them. Most importantly, it details 
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the nature of and the differences between genuine and artificial incentives. 
Next, Chapter 3 is taken from, "Building Better Incentives for Increased Robust-
ness in BitTorrent" by the author, Caleb Spare, and Dan S. Wallach. Contained in 
this part of the thesis is our proposed extension to BitTorrent as well as the intro-
duction of a simulator we developed for evaluating the result. We also examine the 
behavior of BitTyrant, a strategic BitTorrent client, and its effect on our system. 
Part of our overall solution takes advantage of a BitTyrant bug we discovered. 
The subsequent Chapter 4 is largely identical to, "The BitTorrent Anonymity 
Marketplace" by the author and Dan S. Wallach. Herein we present our design for 
the Marketplace, its implementation in simulation, and our results. This chapter also 
discusses significant ethical, legal, and moral issues that naturally arise in anonymity 
discussions. 
Finally, in Chapter 5 we revisit our goals and our findings. This chapter ties 
together our results from the three component papers and discusses the significance. 
It also identifies opportunities for future work and several overarching questions raised 
by our research. 
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Chapter 2 
A Taxonomy of Rational Attacks 
For peer-to-peer services to be effective, participating nodes must cooperate, but in 
most scenarios a node represents a self-interested party and cooperation can neither be 
expected nor enforced. A reasonable assumption is that a large fraction of p2p nodes 
are rational and will attempt to maximize their consumption of system resources 
while minimizing the use of their own. If such behavior violates system policy then it 
constitutes an attack. In this chapter we identify and create a taxonomy for rational 
attacks and then identify corresponding solutions if they exist. The most effective 
solutions directly incentivize cooperative behavior, but when this is not feasible the 
common alternative is to incentivize evidence of cooperation instead. 
2.1 Introduction 
A significant challenge in peer-to-peer (p2p) computing is the problem of cooperation. 
Unlike client-server systems, a p2p network's effectiveness in meeting design goals 
is directly correlated to the cooperation of the member nodes. For example, a p2p 
system might be designed for content distribution. To decrease the upload bandwidth 
burden on the original content server, only a small number of nodes directly contact it. 
The content is then propagated from these nodes to additional peers. This system can 
only scale if nodes are willing to pass on content to downstream peers. Unfortunately, 
a self-interested node may realize that it can save expensive upload bandwidth if it 
chooses not to share. If a large number of nodes are self-interested and refuse to 
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contribute, the system may destabilize. 
In most p2p systems, self-interested behavior at the expense of the system can 
be classified as a rational manipulation failure [15] or, from a different perspective, a 
rational attack*. Successful p2p systems must be designed to be robust against this 
class of failure. Ideally, a p2p system should be perfectly faithful to the designer's 
specification. In such a system, a self-interested, utility-maximizing node "will follow 
the default strategy because... there is no other strategy that yields a higher utility 
for this node" [23]. To achieve faithfulness, a system may employ various measures 
such as problem partitioning, catch-and-punish, and incentives [15]. Even when these 
techniques cannot make a system perfectly faithful, they may be enough to prevent 
destabilization. 
An example of a viable p2p technology designed to be robust against rational 
manipulation failures is BitTorrent [1]. This technology first breaks large files into 
chunks that are downloaded individually and reassembled by the receiver. The re-
ceiving nodes contact one another and trade for chunks they do not yet possess. Each 
node employs an incremental exchange algorithm that leads it to upload chunks to 
cooperating nodes and not to share with selfish ones. These incentives encourage 
cooperative behavior in participating nodes [1]. While BitTorrent is not completely 
immune to rational manipulation, it is viable in practice [23]. 
In this chapter, we identify, analyze, and create a taxonomy of rational attacks in 
p2p systems. We then examine this taxonomy to identify corresponding solutions. In 
the next two sections, we first provide a short background on the economics principles 
applicable to p2p systems and then specify our system model. The following two 
*Our definition for rational follows the narrow definition provided by Shneidman et al [15]. For 
the purposes of this chapter, rational participants are only interested in exploiting the resources and 
benefits of the system. 
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sections define our taxonomy of rational attacks and discuss solutions. The final 
section presents our conclusions. 
2.2 Economics Background 
Much of our analysis of p2p cooperation is based on economic models of game theory 
and mechanism design [21]. In this section, we briefly review some critical terms and 
concepts as they relate to p2p systems. 
An economic game is a model of interaction between players in which the actions 
of any player influence the outcome of all other players. The mechanism in a game 
defines what legitimate actions the players can perform and the outcome of their 
behavior. These outcomes are assigned a numeric value called utility. Players that 
use an algorithm to determine behavior are said to follow a strategy 
Players in the p2p world represent the nodes participating in the system. There 
are two types of nodes that do not strategize. 
• Altruistic or obedient nodes cooperate with the system irrespective of any other 
considerations. 
• Faulty nodes stop responding, drop messages, or act arbitrarily. 
There are two types of nodes that do strategize. 
• Rational nodes strategize to achieve maximal utility and their actions are based 
on their current knowledge and understanding of the p2p system. Rational 
nodes will not attempt to disrupt routing, censor data, or otherwise corrupt 
the system unless such behavior increases the node's access to shared resources. 
These nodes are also described as self-interested. 
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• Irrational nodes also strategize, but their strategies are either incomplete be-
cause they cannot understand the mechanism or they lie outside the economic 
mechanisms of the system. Denial of service or censorship attacks are examples 
of this second form of economically irrational behavior*. 
Mechanism design (MD) is the process of creating games where rational behavior 
by players leads to outcomes desired by the designer. Of course, such systems only 
affect the behavior of rational nodes. Mechanism design has no impact on faulty or 
irrational nodes and we exclude them from further discussion, though we recognize 
that any practical p2p system deployed "in the wild" must be resistant to their 
behavior. Of course, most p2p systems are robust against failure. The impact of 
irrational and malicious nodes is an open research problem that is discussed in Castro 
et al [22]. 
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design (DAMD) is a subclass of MD that 
is computationally tractable and operates without centralization. For this reason 
DAMD is well suited to systems like p2p networks [21]. DAMD assumes each node 
can independently reward the cooperation of other nodes or penalize their misbe-
havior but that each node has only limited information on the global state of the 
system. 
2.3 Model 
2.3.1 Incentives Capabilities 
Incentives in p2p systems have some limitations. First, incentives are limited in 
the guarantees they can provide. While the use of incentives strengthens the p2p 
tOur goal is to design systems which are immune to manipulation by nodes seeking increased 
shared resources. Our definition of rational only includes nodes whose utility function is independent 
of utility payout to other nodes. Strategies, such as censorship strategies, that obtain benefit by 
denying utility to other nodes are considered irrational. 
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system against rational attacks, by themselves they do not guarantee that the system 
is faithful. To be guaranteed faithful, a mechanism must be validated by a formal 
proof, the construction of which is not trivial. 
The second limitation is that they must be DAMD compatible. DAMD is lim-
ited to creating mechanisms that are are computationally tractable across distributed 
computing resources. Nodes are expected to reward cooperation and penalize misbe-
havior, but doing so is difficult when trusted global knowledge is unavailable. 
With these two limitations in mind, we identify two types of incentives that may 
be used to create a faithful p2p system. The first type is genuine incentives and is 
characterized by directly incentivizing cooperation. A genuine incentive ties current 
behavior and future payoff together in some inseparable way. Genuine incentives 
are inherently robust against rational attacks and limit the strategies available to 
adversaries. 
One example of genuine incentives is incremental exchanges as used in Bit Torrent. 
Money could also be an effective genuine incentive but it would require very efficient 
micropayment schemes, where potentially every network packet transmission would 
require an associated payment. Unfortunately, the current generation of such systems 
(e.g., Millicent [39]) were never intended for such fine-grained commerce. 
The second type of incentive is artificial incentives* which incentivize evidence of 
cooperation. Such incentives are weaker than their genuine counterparts because, to 
be rewarded, a node only has to appear to cooperate. Nevertheless, artificial incentives 
are generally easier to create and deploy and may be necessary under circumstances 
•f Roussopoulos et al. suggests that highly valuable shared resources have inherent incentives while 
less valuable ones require an extrinsic or artificial incentives for cooperation [20]. Our concept of 
genuine and artificial incentives is similar, but focuses only on the mechanism and not the value of 
the resources or social network in which the resources are exchanged. 
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where genuine incentives are not feasible. 
Artificial incentives are often designed around an auditing process on top of which 
an enforcement mechanism is layered. In a decentralized system, auditing cannot be 
globally managed. Each node is aware of the system's policies, but is independently 
responsible for determining whether peers are in compliance. This can be done by 
requiring each node to publish assertions about its state which are audited by other 
nodes. An auditing policy of this type is consistent with DAMD; each node is capable 
of determining its behavior within the system. An auditing system, however, is 
subject to the vulnerabilities that we describe in Section 2.4.1. 
2.3.2 Service Maturation 
A p2p service provides some tangible benefit to participating nodes. New partici-
pants may obtain their payout spread over time, or they can obtain maximal benefit 
immediately in a lump sum. We have termed this service characteristic as service 
maturation. A service is mature when a node has obtained all of the benefit that 
the service can provide. Services that give out all possible benefit immediately have 
instantaneous maturation while services that distribute benefit over time have pro-
gressive maturation. Progressive maturation can be further classified as bounded or 
unbounded based on whether or not the service has a known, fixed termination of ben-
efit pay-out. The relationship between the different classes of maturation is illustrated 
in Figure 2.1. 
A content distribution service might have instantaneous or progressive matura-
tion depending on policy. If a newly joined node can completely download its desired 
content before redistributing that content to peers, the service has instantaneous 
maturation. Conversely, BitTorrent has progressive maturation because it only al-
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Figure 2.1 : Service Maturation Taxonomy 
lows nodes to obtain the full content through repeated interaction with the system. 
Because Bit Torrent's pay-out of benefit ends when the file download is complete, its 
progressive maturation is bounded. 
An example of a service with unbounded progressive maturation is a remote back-
up service. In such a system, the benefit payout is distributed over time without a 
fixed point of termination. 
There is a correlation between instantaneous maturation to the Prisoner's Dilemma 
(PD) and progressive maturation to the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD). In the 
single round PD, all of the utility that the game can pay out is disbursed in a single 
interaction. In IPD, the total utility is paid out to participants over some arbitrary 
number of interactions. 
IPD also has an analog to the concept of bounded maturation. The game can be 
played with the players either aware or ignorant of the number of rounds that they 
will play. From the players' perspective, the game is bounded only if they know the 
number of rounds. An IPD game degenerates into a PD game if the number of rounds 
are known. 
Game theoretic analysis has proven that it is not rational to cooperate in single 
round PD but that it is rational to cooperate in IPD [24]. Services with instantaneous 
maturation are extremely susceptable to the attacks described in Section 2.4.2. 
Progressive 
I 
1 
Unbounded 
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2.3.3 System Model 
For convenience, we define a constrained environment suitable to explore rational 
attacks. The p2p model characterized in this section has many features that are 
common to most p2p networks. In Section 2.5 we break some of these assumptions 
as possible solutions to rational attacks. 
Our model is described by the following assumptions and limitations. 
Assumption: Secure node ID's. Douceur [40] observes that if identity within 
the p2p system is not centrally controlled, any participant can simultaneously 
assume a plethora of electronic personae. With many identities at its disposal, a 
participant can subvert the entire network by subverting the routing primitive. 
We assume that the node ID's in our model are made secure in one of three 
ways: 
Trust - Node ID creation and distribution is done through a centralized and 
mutually trusted agent. 
Expense - Node ID creation has some arbitrary cost attached. A participant 
can replace its node ID infrequently and with some difficulty. 
Relevance - Node ID creation is unrestricted because having multiple ID's 
cannot aid the rational attacker. 
Assumption: There is no "trusted" software. A p2p system cannot guaran-
tee that their members are using conforming software. Trusted computing 
technologies allow a node to attest that it is running a conforming applica-
tion [41, 42]. Enforcing a trusted software policy is not only technically chal-
lenging, but developing and deploying such a policy is undesirable to many 
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groups for ethical or practical reasons [43]. 
Assumption: Nodes are computationally limited. We assume that any given 
node may have the same resources as the typical desktop PC. Nodes may subvert 
their machine to behave in arbitrary ways. However nodes are assumed to be 
incapable of breaking cryptographic primitives or taking global control of the 
underlying network. 
Due to the potential size of p2p systems and because nodes are in mutually untrusting 
domains, we apply the following limitations to our model. 
Limitation: Each node maintains minimal state. A node can only have first-
hand observations about a small fraction of the nodes in the system. Similarly a 
node can only maintain state about a small number of the nodes in the system. 
Limitation: No second-hand information. Nodes can only trust what they di-
rectly observe because there is no inherent reason to trust an assertion by any 
node about a third party. An accusation can only be trusted if the evidence is 
independently believable regardless of trust in the accuser. Such proofs usually 
require the cooperation of the accused to create. 
2.4 Taxonomy of Rational Attacks 
The motive for the attacks we consider are unfairly increased access to p2p shared 
resources. We identify two general classes of attack: 
1. Unrecorded Misuse of Resources 
2. Unpunished Misuse of Resources 
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Attacks can be made by a single node, or by several nodes colluding together for an 
advantage. 
2.4.1 Unrecorded Misuse of Resources 
If an attacker can obtain resources without producing a record of the misuse, the 
attacker is safe from any sanctions. Attacks of this kind exploit "holes" in auditing 
policies (policy attacks), or actively disrupt the auditing mechanism (auditing attack). 
Policy Attacks 
A rational node may exploit an auditing policy. We identify two examples. 
Excuses Any legitimate "excuse" for being unable to perform a service may be 
exploited. Such excuses may be needed to deal with edge conditions including 
crash recovery, network interruption, packet loss, etc. Consider a remote backup 
system like Samsara that requires every node to contribute as much space as 
it consumes [44]. If the system policy is overly generous to recovering nodes 
that recently crashed by not requiring them to prove they are maintaining their 
quota, a malicious node may exploit this by repeatedly claiming to have crashed. 
Picking on the newbie Some systems require that new nodes "pay their dues" by 
requiring them to give resources to the system for some period of time before 
they can consume any shared resources [45, 46]. If this policy is not carefully 
designed, a veteran node could move from one newbie node to another, leeching 
resources without being required to give any resources back. 
Auditing Attacks 
Auditing attacks are designed to prevent the auditing system from identifying mis-
behavior. These attacks only apply to designs based around auditing using artificial 
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incentives. Here are a number of examples of this type of attack: 
Fudged books Auditing relies on the accounting records being tamper-resistant 
and difficult to forge. 
Manufactured evidence In this scenario, an attacker who is in a state of non-
compliance manages to produce "proof of compliance deceptively. 
Accounting interruption (kill the auditor) A node being audited can attempt 
to interfere with the auditing node. This might be accomplished by a denial-
of-service attack, a worm, a virus, etc. 
Group deception, local honesty This attack is a type of manufactured evidence 
attack through collusion. Ngan, et al describes an accounting system where 
nodes publishing their debits and credits publicly in logs which are later audited 
by nodes' peers [47]. Debts on one node must match credits on another node, 
making it more difficult for a node to cook its books. However, it is possible for 
single node in debt to become locally honest for an audit by pushing its debt to 
a co-conspirator. As a group, the conspiring nodes' books are not balanced and 
they are in debt jointly. All colluding nodes reciprocate in sharing (or hiding) 
the debt. 
2.4.2 Unpunished Misuse of Resources 
An identified misbehaving node may attempt to avoid or mitigate punishment. Two 
such attacks are: 
Elusion The attacker leaves the system permanently before they can be sanctioned 
by the p2p system. This attack generally exploits short-maturation and high-
value resources. In such a scenario, the attacker obtains the resources and leaves 
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(e.g., join a content distribution service long enough to obtain an object and 
then disappear forever). 
Reincarnation Reincarnation is repeated elusion. The attacker avoids punishment 
for misbehavior by assuming a new node ID thus releasing them from any 
penalties associated with its old reputation. We note that this attack is a limited 
form of the Sybil attack [40] where multiple ID's are acquired and discarded over 
time rather than all at once. 
This class of attacks operates almost entirely against p2p services with instantaneous 
maturation. 
2.5 Solutions 
As stated previously, an ideal p2p system is perfectly faithful, but creating such a 
mechanism and proving its validity is difficult. In some cases a perfectly faithful 
design may be impossible, but a p2p system need not be perfectly faithful to be 
viable. In this section, we describe defenses against rational attacks by self-interested 
nodes in descending order of theoretical effectiveness. 
2.5.1 Eliminate rationality as a concern 
Under certain circumstances, forcing all nodes to be obedient may be practical and 
desirable. We identify three options for coercing obedience. 
Out-of-band trust Obedience is enforced external to the p2p system. Such a sce-
nario might be viable for a group of friends, or centrally administered machines 
within corporations, academic institutions, and government agencies. 
Partial centralization It may be possible to introduce some aspect of centraliza-
tion that induces nodes to be obedient. For instance a central authority can 
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be used to require secure node ID creation. BitTorrent uses a central authority 
to act as a rendezvous point where nodes can determine the addresses of their 
peers. 
Trusted software - If a user is prevented from modifying their software, they must 
behave obediently. Many software applications are closed-source and difficult to 
modify. This may also be done with "trusted computing" technologies [48, 42]. 
2.5.2 Design genuine incentives 
Genuine incentives are always preferred to artificial incentives. Because they are 
often difficult to implement in a DAMD context, it may be tempting for a designer 
to overlook them. Not only do genuine incentives eliminate many of the attacks 
described in Section 2.4.1, but they are also simpler than artificial incentives because 
they require no additional enforcement mechanisms. 
For example, consider a back-up system with a storage policy similar to Samsara 
where each node must provide as much disk-space as it consumes in backups. One 
artificial incentives approach proposed by Fuqua, et al is to require that all nodes 
publish what data they are storing locally and to prove that they actually have that 
data in their possession on audit [47]. The auditing mechanism may be vulnerable to 
one or more of the auditing attacks described in Section 2.4.1. 
A genuine incentive for the remote back-up service is to require that all of a 
node's data that is stored on the network be tangled with the data it is supposed 
to be storing [45]. Nodes can then occasionally broadcast portions of the tangled 
data they are storing and ask for its owner to claim it or risk its deletion. Now the 
self-interested node must actually keep the data it claims to be storing or it cannot 
recognize claim-requests for its own data. However, to be useful, there must be a 
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policy that allows a node to reclaim its data after a crash even if it has lost all local-
storage. This policy may expose the mechanism to the excuses attack described in 
Section 2.4.1. Despite this weakness, however, this mechanism is more robust and 
significantly simpler than the auditing alternative. 
2.5.3 Improving artificial incentives design 
Artificial incentives are a less desirable solution to rational attacks, but they may 
be the easiest to design into a service and are sometimes the only viable solution. 
Artificial incentives will generally entail having a well-defined auditing policy. A 
number of design decisions influence the effetiveness of these incentives. 
Eliminating instantaneous maturation 
A service which instantaneously matures is difficult to secure against rational attacks. 
Once a rational node has obtained the maximum benefit for a service, it has no in-
centive to continue participation. Thus, services that instantly mature are inherently 
vulnerable to elusion and reincarnation attacks. Also, because a node obtains its de-
sired utility quickly, there is not much time for an auditing scheme to stop an attacker. 
Several techniques may help convert instantaneous to progressive maturation: 
Centralized ID Creation If node ID's are centrally created and distributed, a 
node will be forced to maintain its identity in all of its future interactions with 
the p2p system. In this case if a node steals from the system and leaves, it will 
face punishment when it returns. 
Security Deposit A node must contribute resources during a probationary period 
before it can benefit from the system's shared resources. Tangier is an example 
of system using this technique [45, 46]. 
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Limited number of peers 
Changing a node's ID incurs a cost. If an auditing system can detect and kick out a 
misbehaving node sufficiently fast, then the cost of changing identity outweighs the 
benefit. In most p2p systems, a node can only access the network through a limited 
number of neighbors. Once an attacker has freeloaded on its neighbors, they will 
refuse to interact with it and it will be effectively removed from the system. This 
solution has been used for multicast and storage accounting [18, 49, 50]. 
Reputation 
With perfect global knowledge of every peer's behavior, a node would be incentivized 
to cooperate because any time it cheated, that information would be immediately 
available to all of its peers. Unfortunately, perfect global knowledge is only possible 
through an oracle which is not available in a DAMD context such as p2p networks. 
Distributed systems may try to recreate the notion of a global, trusted oracle 
using gossip protocols, rating schemes, or some other from of peer endorsements. 
Mojo Nation had a global reputation system and EigenTrust describes how such 
systems might be built [51]. 
Protecting an auditing infrastructure 
Because artificial incentives require building and protecting an auditing infrastruc-
ture, these mechanisms have additional complexity that may be prone to design and 
implementation errors. We suggests three practices for building effective auditing 
mechanisms: 
Force the truth to be told Nodes can usually only believe what they observe for 
themselves. Secure history techniques [52], however, may be useful to generate 
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authenticated records of misbehavior that are trustable by remote hosts. 
Double-entry bookkeeping A double-entry bookkeeping system as described ear-
lier in Section 2.4.1. 
Create a global clock When multiple nodes are being audited, they may be able 
to pass debts around from one node to the next, such that any particular node, 
while it is being audited, appears to have its books balanced. If several nodes 
can be simultaneously audited at provably the same time, this may defeat such 
attacks. Again, secure history techniques may provide an approximate solution 
to this problem. 
2.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter we explored a number of rational attacks. While we used a narrow 
definition of "rational", we feel that this usage is justified by the unique nature of 
such attacks. Prom our analysis, we believe that designs that incorporate genuine 
incentives will generally be simpler and more robust that those with artificial incen-
tives. Artificial incentives often require an auditing mechanism that is complicated 
and difficult to construct. 
Unfortunately, given the difficulty of designing and implementing genuine incen-
tives in a DAMD context such as p2p networks, artificial incentives will often be 
essential to incentivize cooperation for some parts of the system. When this is the 
case, avoiding instantaneous maturation eliminates unpunished misuse of resources 
attacks. A carefully designed policy and a robust auditing scheme are essential to 
mitigating unrecorded misuse of resources. 
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Chapter 3 
Long-Term Incentives in BitTorrent 
BitTorrent is a widely-deployed, peer-to-peer file transfer protocol engineered with a 
"tit for tat" mechanism that encourages cooperation. Unfortunately, there is little 
incentive for nodes to altruistically provide service to their peers after they finish 
downloading a file, and what altruism there is can be exploited by aggressive clients 
like BitTyrant. This altruism, called seeding, is always beneficial and sometimes 
essential to BitTorrent's real-world performance. We propose a new long-term in-
centives mechanism in BitTorrent to encourage peers to seed and we evaluate its 
effectiveness via simulation. We show that when nodes running our algorithm re-
ward one another for good behavior in previous swarms, they experience as much as 
a 50% improvement in download times over unrewarded nodes. Even when aggres-
sive clients, such as BitTyrant, participate in the swarm, our rewarded nodes still 
outperform them, although by smaller margins. 
3.1 Introduction 
Peer-to-peer file transfer protocols provide scalable architectures for distributing large 
files. The core idea is to have peers participating in the download also contribute 
upload service back to the system, thus scaling the available bandwidth as more peers 
join. Even centralized services with large network connections can be overwhelmed 
by flash crowds, while p2p services can ostensibly continue to scale, even in such 
extreme scenarios. 
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In the practical world, however, scalability and stability in p2p systems are limited 
by the cooperation of the participants. These systems only have as much bandwidth as 
is collectively donated. Proper behavior cannot necessarily be enforced; participants 
are going to behave rationally, taking whatever steps maximize their own benefit 
without particularly caring about the well-being of other peers. Consequently, the 
default behavior of most participants is to consume and not contribute. This is often 
called the "free rider" problem. 
BitTorrent [1] mitigates the free rider problem by rewarding uploads by granting 
faster downloads through a "tit for tat" (TFT) protocol, thus making cooperation 
a rational behavior. This design has been highly successful, enabling BitTorrent's 
wide acceptance in the Internet community. While there is no consensus on the true 
amount of BitTorrent data in-flight today, it is clear that the number is large at 
somewhere between one-third and one-half of all Internet traffic [30, 31, 32, 53]. 
Despite the practical success of BitTorrent, numerous researchers have exposed 
weaknesses to the TFT incentives mechanism [25, 26, 27, 28]. One prominent weak-
ness is the significant level of altruism that remains in the system despite the TFT 
mechanism. More specifically, many peers still contribute significant upload band-
width without necessarily improving their download performance. Such contributions 
are produced by asymmetries in upload and download bandwidth as well as by al-
truistic BitTorrent behaviors like seeding and optimistic unchoking. (Section 3.2.3 
discusses this "ambient altruism" in detail.) 
These exploits are not simply theoretical. BitTyrant [25] takes advantage of the 
intrinsic altruism to achieve high download rates while reducing upload contributions. 
Most BitTorrent clients can be easily configured to rely exclusively on leeching, and 
some research suggests this is effective despite the TFT incentives [29, 27]. 
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Our goal in this work is to reduce the altruism in BitTorrent seeding by adding 
incentives to the seeding component of the protocol. We present the design and eval-
uation of our seeding reward algorithm which requires a minor change to BitTorrent 
in the form of a long-term identifier for participating clients. Through simulation 
we demonstrate that rewarded peers get better performance than unrewarded peers. 
This differential creates an incentive for rational nodes to switch into the rewarded 
population. We further show that the rewarding mechanism improves node perfor-
mance even when some portion of the swarm is composed of Bit Tyrant nodes. 
In the remainder of the chapter, we first review the operations and altruism of 
BitTorrent in Section 4.2 as well as an overview of the BitTyrant variant. Sections 
3.3 and 3.4 present our algorithm and the methodology we use to evaluate its perfor-
mance. Our results are detailed in Section 4.5 and further analyzed in Section 4.6. 
We close with a discussion of related work in Section 4.3 and our conclusions in 
Section 4.7. 
3.2 Background 
BitTorrent [1] is a highly successful and popular peer-to-peer protocol which aims to 
enable efficient, rapid distribution of potentially large amounts of data to a group of 
clients. It is designed to utilize the available upload bandwidth of the clients to scale 
the capacity of the system to support many users and has built-in mechanisms to 
incentivize participation in this scheme. 
3.2.1 The BitTorrent Protocol 
A torrent is a file or a set of files users wish to download. The data is divided into 
equal-sized pieces, typically 256KB, which are further subdivided into small blocks. 
A central node called the tracker keeps track of the peers participating in the distri-
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bution of a torrent. The tracker does not serve the actual content, but instead serves 
as a rendezvous point for peers to discover one another. 
BitTorrent clients use a file of metadata, called a torrent file, to begin download-
ing content. This file, typically downloaded from a traditional web server, specifies 
the address for the tracker as well as information about the files to be downloaded, 
including names, sizes, and SHA-1 checksums for each piece. 
The set of clients working on downloading a given torrent is referred to as a swarm. 
Clients notify the tracker as they join and leave the swarm, as well as every 30 minutes 
they are active within the swarm. To discover other clients, a client may query the 
tracker, which gives it a random subset of the active peers. (A variety of extensions 
exist which supplement the tracker, including a gossip protocol as well two DHT-
based schemes.) Once it has a set of peers, a client establishes TCP connections to 
its peers, forming a neighborhood with whom it shares information about which pieces 
it has and has not completed downloading. A legitimate publisher might establish 
one or more official seeds, which provide round-robbin, best-effort service to anyone 
who asks. These seeds are then supplemented by altruistic peers who seed after they 
finish their downloads. 
3.2.2 BitTorrent Strategies 
Popular BitTorrent clients employ a number of strategies to encourage fair participa-
tion in uploading and to deal with a variety of corner cases [1]. 
A client only uploads to a small number of peers in its neighborhood at any given 
time. This group of nodes is called the client's active set. The size of the active 
set is typically four, although both the reference implementation and BitTyrant [25] 
note that this number should scale with maximum upload bandwidth capacity. The 
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majority of the nodes in the active set are the nodes that have given the best service 
over a rolling 20 second average. The client saves one or two slots in the active set for 
the exploration of new neighbors. Optimistic unchokes pick a random peer every 30 
seconds, allowing the client to search for better neighbors while also bootstrapping 
newly joined clients that have not yet downloaded anything to share. 
BitTorrent clients share current status information with other clients to indicate 
which pieces are completely downloaded. Clients will bias their block requests to 
complete one piece before they begin downloading a different piece. To pick a piece 
to download, BitTorrent follows a rarest first policy, where a client picks pieces based 
on lowest availability within its neighborhood. The exception to this rule is for new 
clients, which need a complete piece before they can advertise any content for upload. 
In this case, they instead pick a random piece. 
When a block has been requested, a client does not reissue the request until either 
the block is received or the request times out. This can be a problem when a user has 
received most of the pieces in a file and has just has a few outstanding requests to 
go. If the final peers are slow or unresponsive, the system might never finish. In this 
case, the client goes into endgame mode and sends redundant requests for any missing 
blocks to its peers; as they are received the client sends messages to the remaining 
peers to cancel unnecessary requests. 
3.2.3 Ambient Altruism and BitTyrant 
BitTorrent aims to reduce the free-rider problem, but it is not intended to eliminate 
altruism in the system. Instead, BitTorrent aims to ensure that a node will expe-
rience significantly improved performance if it participates in TFT trading, rather 
than leeching. Consequently, altruistic features remain in the protocol and pose two 
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separate, but related, problems. First, a client can reduce or eliminate its own altru-
istic participation, reducing the overall swarm performance. Second, if a client can 
recognize peers that are participating altruistically, it may be able to obtain suffi-
cient service from these peers to find it unnecessary to deal with those that require 
cooperation. 
Two significant sources of altruistic contributions are seeding and optimistic un-
choking. Seeding is inherently altruistic under the current Bit Torrent protocol. The 
altruism of optimistic unchoking is more complex. The optimistic unchoke operation 
is Bit Torrent's method of searching the peer space for better TFT service. An un-
choke that results in improved service because a better peer is found is clearly not 
altruistic, but unchokes are performed with random peers, rather than being biased 
away from known leeches. This means that BitTorrent's standard unchoking behavior 
can still provide a source of altruism, to the benefit of leeches. 
Differences between peer bandwidth capacities also produce altruism. When a 
normal BitTorrent client unchokes a peer, it sends data as fast as the TCP stack will 
go, so peers with faster network connections will tend to give more out than they get 
in return when dealing with slower peers. Of course, two fast peers with content to 
trade will be more likely to establish TFT trading with one another than a fast peer 
and a slow peer. 
BitTyrant is a strategic BitTorrent variant that exploits ambient altruism and 
reduces its own altruistic contributions [25]. BitTyrant was designed to download as 
fast as possible while contributing the minimum amount required to achieve it. To 
achieve this, BitTyrant abandons BitTorrent's policy of giving each member of the 
active set an equal share of its upload bandwidth. Instead, BitTyrant unchokes as 
many neighbors as possible but limits the speed of each upload stream to be only as 
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much as is necessary to obtain reciprocation. 
This scheme does not work for other BitTyrant nodes, however, and two BitTyrant 
nodes must enter a special mode when dealing with each other. In Section 3.5.6, we 
will describe this special mode in detail and demonstrate how it can be used as part 
of a defense against Bit Tyrant's behavior. 
3.3 Incentives Design 
Our incentives design for seeding in Bit Torrent requires that the BitTorrent protocol 
support some form of long-term identifier. The basic concept for our algorithm is 
that BitTorrent clients recognize seeders from previous swarms and this is impossible 
without these IDs. Fortunately, the exchange of long-term identifiers can be built into 
the peer handshaking process in a backwards compatible fashion. Clients without a 
long-term ID are simply assumed to have no history. It is also worth noting that 
some clients [54] already support an optional long-term ID. 
Our proposed design consists of an observation phase and a reward phase. The 
observation phase is in effect whenever the node is receiving seeding bytes, or bytes 
received from a neighboring peer without the expectation of TFT reciprocation. The 
detection of seeding bytes, in our basic implementation, is based on first-hand, veri-
fiable information only. Obviously, it is possible that the neighbor is only pretending 
to seed, but from the observing node's perspective, all bytes received without giving 
any bytes in return are seeded bytes. 
The reward phase occurs when the node is in seeding mode. The goal is to schedule 
outbound seeding with higher priority given to peers who have seeded in the past. 
To do this, the algorithm first computes a score for each node; nodes who seeded get 
higher scores. These scores are used to initialize a scheduler, giving more slots to 
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nodes with higher scores. While virtually any scheduling algorithm would suffice, we 
chose to use lottery scheduling [55]. Each peer gets at least one ticket, but peers that 
seed get additional tickets in proportion to the logarithm of the number of bytes we 
have received from them in seeding. 
Obviously, a node that chooses to be a good citizen and seed may not be rewarded 
at all in the future. For node A to be rewarded by node B, A must seed to B and 
then B must seed to A in some subsequent swarm. That means that both nodes must 
interact repeatedly over time. For any real benefit to the algorithm, a group of nodes 
must interact repeatedly. 
We note that a Sybil attack [40] is possible against this protocol. For example, 
malicious nodes could create a large number of false identifiers, gaining additional 
shares of the bandwidth. We deal with this by reserving a percentage of a seeder's 
upstream bandwidth for other known seeders. Sybil attackers may well fight it out for 
the remaining unreserved bandwidth, but there is a larger pool of bandwidth available 
if they cooperate. 
Another possible Sybil attack would be a reincarnation attack [56] where a client 
sheds an old identifier for a new identifier in every swarm to erase previously observed 
bad behavior. Such behavior would be unhelpful to the node, however, because a 
fresh identifier begins with no rewards at all. Rewards only come with observed good 
behavior. 
3.4 Methodology 
3.4.1 Simulator 
We chose simulation as our primary method for analyzing incentives and altruism in 
Bit Torrent. The advantages of a simulator over real world tests or the use of network 
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emulation lies primarily in the repeatability of the experiment and the time required 
to run the experiment. Our research requires comparison of algorithms against one 
another as well as experimentation with hundreds of combinations of parameters. 
Repeatability and fast time to completion were both incredibly helpful. 
Several Bit Torrent simulators exist but they did not fully meet our needs. One 
simulator from MSR [57] does not implement asynchronous communication nor does 
it capture some BitTorrent details, such as piece chunk transmission, that we deemed 
necessary. An ns-2 [58] BitTorrent simulator was also available, but it simulates 
TCP effects and other network level details that were too low level for our purposes. 
GPS [59] is a general purpose p2p simulator that includes a BitTorrent module and 
simulates at about the same level of granularity as our work. GPS is written in Java 
and our work appears to run faster. 
To meet our objective, we have designed an optimized C++ simulator with a 
Python front end for simulation setup and execution. Our simulator allows swarms of 
thousands of clients, with several hundred running simultaneously, many times faster 
than real-time. To illustrate this, we ran a series of tests on an Athlon 2.4Ghz dual-
processor server with 4GB of RAM and running with the Linux 2.6.9 kernel. These 
tests employed a simple swarm where a given number of clients arrive simultaneously 
and join the swarm. There is only a single seed for the swarm. We fix the file size 
at 100MB, the seed's upload capacity at 512Kbps, and each client's bandwidth at 
56Kbps, symmetric for uploads and downloads. The results for various swarm sizes is 
shown in Table 3.1. These results show that the time required to simulate the swarm 
is proportional to the number of peers. 
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n 
10 
100 
1000 
Sim Time (hours) 
5.86 
4.77 
5.24 
Real Time (hours) 
0.004 
0.07 
0.86 
Messages 
233,950 
1,381,715 
13,635,955 
Memory (MB) 
20 
60 
492 
Table 3.1 : Basic simulator performance as the number of simulated nodes (n) grows. 
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Figure 3.1 : Simulated swarm membership over time based on a real-world trace from 
a flash-crowd swarm. 
3.4.2 Simulation Setup 
All the evaluations in this chapter are based on a flash-crowd, 1GB file Bit Torrent 
swarm. We used a total population of 2000 DSL clients with a range of download 
bandwidths from 128Kbps to 5Mbps. Each client's upload bandwidth is precisely half 
of its download bandwidth. To obtain reasonable churn, we make use of real-world 
BitTorrent traces taken in 2005 by Johan Pouwelse. These traces provide realistic 
join times for flash-crowd behavior in real swarms. 
Each simulation is also configured with experiment-specific parameters. The sig-
nificant parameters are: 
N\ 
- jo ins 
- seed only 
- swarmsize 
V\ 
aftsadri^sa*^^ 
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Seeding Time The 2000 clients of the swarm are assigned one of three seeding 
population types. Altruistic clients will seed for 24 to 48 hours after their download 
is complete. Standard clients seed for one to two hours. Leech clients terminate their 
connection immediately after downloading the object. These values are based on why 
peers choose to seed; altruistic clients intentionally stay around to be helpful, standard 
clients will continue running until the user notices the download is done and kills the 
client, and leech clients leave as quickly as possible. Even though these numbers are 
guesses, we have validated that a swarm with 10% altruistic nodes and 70% standard 
nodes yields seed-to-swarm ratios similar to those observed in a prior measurement 
study. (Figure 3.1 in this chapter closely resembles Figure 5 in Pouwelse et al. [33].) 
Seeding Algorithm Populations in the swarm can be assigned to use different 
seeding algorithms. The standard seeding algorithm simply seeds round-robbin to 
all of the peers in a seed's neighborhood. We also support an "incentives seeding" 
algorithm, as described in Section 3.3. 
Incentives Seeding Parameters For peers using the incentives seeding algorithm, 
we can vary the bandwidth reservation for rewards as a percentage of the total band-
width; all incentives seeding nodes will use the same reservation percentage in a given 
simulation run. Also, for nodes using our rewarding seeding algorithm, we invent a 
past history for each one, assigning them a number of bytes that they have seeded in 
the past. We similarly vary what portion of the population are aware of this history, 
allowing us to simulate everything from oracular knowledge of every node's past be-
havior down to fragmentary knowledge that would be a more realistic approximation 
of prior, first-hand observations. 
While oracular knowledge is unrealistic in practice, it allows us to place an up-
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per bound on the benefits of seeding policies that use this knowledge. First hand 
information is more limited in scope but much more difficult to exploit [56]. In our 
research we are assuming that there are no disjoint cliques of overlapping peers. This 
would seem to adequately capture common classes of real-world behavior as we might 
expect from people who download related content, such as new episodes of TV shows 
released on a weekly basis. 
Trading Algorithm We have implemented both the regular Bit Torrent TFT and 
the Bit Tyrant trading algorithms in our simulator. Trading and seeding algorithms 
may be assigned independently; a peer can use the BitTyrant trading algorithm and 
our incentives seeding algorithm if desired. 
3.4.3 Incentives Evaluation 
Our goal is to create an incentive for participants in Bit Torrent to seed. We will eval-
uate the effectiveness of our algorithm by demonstrating that rewarded populations 
perform better than unrewarded populations in our simulated swarms. By running 
the experiments under a variety of configuration parameters, we will characterize how 
these parameters affect the success of our incentives algorithm. 
In evaluating the performance of a node, our basic measurement is the download 
efficiency, denned as the utilization of the peer's download pipe over its lifetime in 
the swarm. Efficiency is a direct measure of the node's happiness, and it is perfectly 
normalized. Any node, regardless of speed, cannot be happier than when it has 100% 
download utilization. 
Computing the efficiency e is straightforward. Let k be the maximum download 
capacity of the node measured in bits per second (bps). Then let t0 be the time the 
peer connected to the swarm and let tj be the time that it finished the download, 
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Median Efficiency 
Altruistic 
98.8 
Standard 
48.9 
(%) 
Leech 
90.1 
Median Download time (s) 
Altruistic 
3304 
Standard 
7443 
Leech 
4402 
Table 3.2 : Comparison of median efficiency and median download time for the same 
experiment. 
Population 
Altruistic 
Standard 
Leech 
Average 
98.0% 
57.9% 
87.6% 
Std. Dev 
1.8% 
8.5% 
4.8% 
95% Confidence Interval 
4.1% 
15.3% 
8.2% 
Table 3.3 : Median efficiency, averaged over twenty different experimental runs, dif-
fering only in the random seed. 
Population 
Altruistic 
Standard 
"Leech" 
Average 
97.9% 
71.1% 
71.2% 
Std. Dev 
1.9% 
7.9% 
7.6% 
95% Confidence Interval 
4.6% 
11.9% 
12.9% 
Table 3.4 : Median efficiency, averaged over twenty experimental runs as above, with 
the leech nodes replaced by standard nodes. 
where both values are measured in seconds. Finally, let n be the number of bits in 
the download object. Then 
6
~ k 
Of course, when simulating a large population of nodes with various configura-
tions assigned at random, we would expect significant variation in individual nodes' 
efficiency, even when they have the same configuration. Figure 3.2 shows cumulative 
distribution functions over nodes' efficiency in a simulation with altruistic, standard, 
and leech nodes. A curve that stays closer to the bottom of the graph, as the altru-
istic data series does, represents more nodes operating closer to their peak efficiency. 
(This experiment shares the same configuration as used later in Figure 3.12.) 
While we could potentially generate a figure like this for every possible simulation 
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Figure 3.2 : Cumulative distribution of efficiency (bandwidth utilization) over differ-
ent populations in the same swarm. 
100, 
Optimal 
Altruistic 
Standard 
Leech 
te To* Download Time (s) 10» 
Figure 3.3 : Cumulative distribution of download time over different populations in 
the same swarm. (A different view of the same experiment shown in Figure 3.2.) 
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configuration, and every simulation run would generate a figure with the same general 
shape, this would obscure trends from one simulation to the next. Instead, we observe 
that the median value of each data series (i.e., the efficiency value for which the data 
series reaches 50% on the y-axis) represents an effective proxy for the overall behavior 
of the data. If the median values are close, then the curves will be close. If the median 
values are far apart, then the curves will be far apart. 
For our experiments, then, any given set of experimental parameters (as described 
in Section 3.4.2) will yield three values: the median efficiency of each of the three 
populations (altruistic, standard, and leech), which we can then plot as we vary the 
simulation parameters. 
An alternative to efficiency would be to consider the download times, without nor-
malizing them for differences in each node's available bandwidth. Figure 3.3 shows 
CDFs of download times for the same experimental setup as Figure 3.2. We added 
an "optimal" distribution, representing the best that the altruistic nodes could ever 
have performed if they had achieved 100% utilization of their download bandwidth. 
We could have added additional "optimal" lines for each population, but this would 
make reading the figure more complicated. Furthermore, median values are less mean-
ingful because the underlying distribution of bandwidths would vary if the random 
assignment were done differently. 
Of course, absolute download time and download efficiency are measuring the 
same underlying phenomenon; improving one metric would clearly improve the other. 
Table 3.2 shows the median values from each of these figures. The efficiency values 
elide unnecessary experimental details and concisely describe the relative performance 
of each population. 
Lastly, we must convince ourselves that efficiency is a reliable metric from one 
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experimental run to the next. Since many of the parameters in our system are assigned 
randomly, we experimentally re-ran our experiment twenty times, each time with a 
different random seed. The results, shown in Table 3.3, show significant variation 
from one run to the next, but the variations among altruistic nodes are smaller than 
among standard nodes. For an additional experiment, we changed the leech nodes 
to be standard nodes. We would expect, then, that they would behave the same as 
standard nodes. Table 3.4 clearly validates this behavior. 
From these measurements, it appears that standard nodes are more likely to be 
the victims of circumstance, while altruistic nodes and leech nodes are more stable 
in the face of random variation. As such, the reported performance of standard 
nodes should be considered to be noisier than the reported performance of altruistic 
or leech nodes. While we could precisely work out the minimum change between 
different populations that would represent a statistically significant difference, this is 
insufficient for our needs. Experimentally, we must show that our desired altruistic 
behavior doesn't just make a statistically significant improvement. We must show a 
large enough improvement to incentivize BitTorrent users to choose clients that follow 
our desired behavior. 
(For the remainder of the chapter, we only run each experiment a single time for 
a given set of experimental parameters. Since each data point takes as long as a day 
to compute, we cannot afford to run every experiment twenty different times.) 
3.5 Evaluation 
In this section, we detail the findings of our research. We will first demonstrate why 
seeding is important for swarms of nodes with asymmetric bandwidth. We will then 
demonstrate how our algorithm improves performance for seeding nodes. The next 
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Figure 3.4 : The median efficiency of the overall swarm under different compositions 
of clients. The worst performance is experienced when there is only one seed. When 
70% of the clients seeding for 1-2 hours, the performance improves significantly. When 
10% of the nodes seed for 1-2 days, the median efficiency approaches 100%. 
three subsections explore how bandwidth reservation, altruistic population size, and 
rewarding node overlap impact the effectiveness of our seeding algorithm. Finally, we 
analyze the performance of our algorithm in swarms that include BitTyrant nodes. 
3.5.1 Importance of Seeding 
Our first objective was to establish the importance of seeding to a BitTorrent swarm. 
We ran our simulation with three different population configurations. First, we ran 
the swarm with 1 initial seed and 100% of the swarm composed of our leech clients 
that do no seeding whatsoever. Next, we ran the swarm with 1 initial seed, 70% of 
the standard clients that do a small amount of seeding, and 30% of the leech clients. 
Finally, we ran a simulation with 10% altruistic nodes that seed significantly, 70% of 
the standard clients, and 20% of the leech clients. The results are shown in Figure 3.4. 
There are two reasons why the swarm cannot obtain high efficiency without signif-
icant seeding contributions. First, the swarm is comprised of nodes with asymmetric 
bandwidth profiles. In our swarm, the upload is always half of the download ca-
pacity. Even with idealized operations, a swarm could hope for no more than 50% 
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efficiency from TFT trading alone. The second issue is that a BitTorrent swarm is not 
ideal. Various factors such as churn reduce the effectiveness of the protocol. Seeding 
provides enough additional capacity to overcome these deficiencies. 
Clearly, seeding is essential for nodes in a swarm to maximize their download 
bandwidth; if we can design a mechanism that incentivizes more BitTorrent users to 
seed for longer periods, this should have a clear, positive impact on the system. 
3.5.2 Rewarding Seeding 
To evaluate our reward seeding algorithm, we first ran a baseline simulation. The 
setup for this simulation was 10% altruistic nodes, 70% of the standard clients, and 
20% of the leech clients. All three populations were running the standard BitTorrent 
trading and seeding algorithms, thus we expected all three populations to experience 
similar performance. As expected, the results for all three populations was near 100% 
efficiency. 
We then repeated this baseline experiment with all of the altruistic nodes con-
figured to run our reward seeding algorithm, reserving 75% of their bandwidth for 
rewards to prior seeders. The other two populations continued to use normal seeding 
algorithms. In this version of our experiment, we assumed perfect overlap for this 
altruistic group. In other words, every altruistic node had been previously seeded 
by every other altruistic node, prior to the start of the experiment, and would thus 
allow the other altruistic nodes to share in the bandwidth reserved for rewards. The 
results of this simulation are shown in Figure 3.5. The altruistic population main-
tained nearly perfect efficiency, while the two unrewarded populations experienced a 
significant drop in performance. 
42 
Figure 3.5 : Median efficiency when the altruistic population reserves 75% of the 
seeding bandwidth for other altruistic nodes. 
3.5.3 Bandwidth Reservation 
As described before, our seeding algorithm can reserve bandwidth for the exclusive 
use of nodes being rewarded. To understand the necessity of these bandwidth reserva-
tions, we ran a simulation where we varied the percentage of reserved vs. unreserved 
seeding bandwidth. The results, shown in Figure 3.6, show the median efficiency of 
the altruistic, standard, and leech populations in simulations with different reserved 
bandwidth configurations. In all simulations, there are 10% altruistic, 70% standard, 
and 20% leech clients. The bandwidth reservation applies to altruistic nodes' seeding 
bandwidth. For the moment, we are assuming that altruistic nodes all have prior 
history and know which other nodes have seeded in the past. 
One immediate observation is that our seeding algorithm, without any bandwidth 
reservation, does no better than normal seeding. This seems counter-intuitive because 
the rewarded nodes should still be getting more seeded bytes than their unrewarded 
peers. One might think that there would be some performance improvement for 
the altruistic nodes, even with 0% reserved bandwidth, but they are already getting 
nearly 100% efficiency. 
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Figure 3.6 : Median efficiency as a function of the reserved bandwidth by the altruistic 
nodes. 
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Figure 3.7 : Median efficiency as a function of the percentage of altruistic nodes in 
the swarm. 
4 * beech 
• •-•Standard 
'—* Altruistic 
40 60 
Percent Altruistic Overlap 
Figure 3.8 : Median efficiency as a function of the percentage of overlap in the altru-
istic nodes. 
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With bandwidth reservations, if there is insufficient demand from the "reward" 
population, then that portion of the seeding bandwidth will go unused. In short, 
our work suggests that the only way to create a performance differential between 
rewarded and non-rewarded nodes is to withhold service from unrewarded nodes. 
There is an interesting trade-off, however. If the reservation is too high, then all 
of the bandwidth is effectively being spent on maintaining old relationships rather 
than establishing new ones. As nodes quit old swarms and join new ones on a regular 
basis, there is a clear incentive to have seeded to strangers in the past if there might 
be a payout in the future. 
3.5.4 Altruistic Population Size 
We cannot predict what percentage of nodes in a given swarm might be running our 
reward seeding algorithm. We would like to verify, regardless of the breakdown, that 
incremental growth in the reward seeding group will yield benefits both for those 
nodes as well as for everybody else. This leads to the question of how the system will 
respond as the population dynamics change. Figure 3.7 shows how efficiency changes 
as a function of the percentage of the altruistic and standard populations in the total 
swarm. The leech population is fixed at 20% and the rewarding nodes reserve 75% of 
their bandwidth. 
This experiment demonstrates that the performance of the entire swarm improves 
as more nodes follow our altruistic scheme, even when reserving 75% of their band-
width for reward seeding. That other 25% is enough to improve things for everybody 
else. 
At some point, beyond the 30% altruism rate where we terminated our simulation, 
the standard nodes may have sufficient efficiency that they would be disincentivized 
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to change to the altruism strategy. By then, the altruism strategy would already be 
the dominant behavior in the swarm. Also, regardless of the rate of altruistic nodes, 
this experiment shows that altruism always wins, and sometimes wins big, even with 
relatively low populations of altruistic nodes. 
3.5.5 Overlap 
In this section, we explore the highly critical overlap parameter. Our algorithm 
assumes that nodes are rewarding based on first-hand information gleaned from prior 
interactions in prior swarms. In previous experiments, we have assumed that this 
knowledge of prior interactions, which we call overlap, is complete. Every node has 
prior, positive interactions with its altruistic peers and thus knows to include them 
in the reward population during future interactions. Such oracular knowledge is not 
realistic. 
For simulation purposes, we wish to vary the degree to which altruistic nodes have 
had past interactions with other altruistic nodes and thus have the first-hand knowl-
edge necessary to give reward seeding to their peers. To accomplish this, we partition 
the altruistic nodes into two sub-groups: rewarding and non-rewarding nodes. Re-
warding nodes will reward all other altruistic nodes, including non-rewarders, while 
non-rewarding nodes will reward nobody. Non-rewarding nodes still have the same 
75% bandwidth reservation, but they never use it. By varying the ratio of rewarding 
to non-rewarding nodes, we can roughly simulate the real-world effects that might be 
seen as the degree of overlap between altruistic nodes varies. 
Figure 3.8 shows the efficiency for each population as a function of the percentage 
of altruistic nodes that are rewarders. We maintain a 10% altruistic, 70% standard, 
and 20% leech population. Reserved bandwidth remains fixed at 75%. 
46 
Our experiment demonstrates that overlap is clearly necessary to achieve the 
benefits of our reward seeding strategy. Once the overlap reaches 50% (i.e., about 
half of the seeding interactions between altruistic nodes are rewarded with higher 
bandwidth), the performance improvement for the altruistic strategy is undeniable. 
Whether such an overlap rate can be achieved in the real world is unclear. We discuss 
some strategies that might compensate for this in Section 4.6. 
3.5.6 Seeding Rewards versus BitTyrant 
In this section, we test the altruistic reward seeding algorithm against clients run-
ning the more aggressive BitTyrant trading algorithm. BitTyrant clients tend to see 
improved performance at the expense of other nodes in the system. (BitTyrant was 
introduced in Section 3.2.3.) 
Our first experiment, shown in Figure 3.9, pits rewarding seeders against tyranni-
cal leeches. This test repeats the bandwidth reservation experiment of Section 3.5.3 
with the leeching population configured to use the BitTyrant trading algorithm. All 
other parameters remain the same. 
Comparing these results against those of the earlier bandwidth reservation test, 
we note that BitTyrant-leeches performed as well as the rewarded altruists. At the 
same time the leeches degraded the performance of the standard nodes significantly. 
From this we conclude that the reward-seeding algorithm protects against, or at least 
ameliorates the exploitation of the BitTyrant protocol, but that it does not sufficiently 
penalize the leeching clients. 
To evaluate how the size of the altruistic population impacts the performance 
of these populations, we repeated the experiment of Section 3.5.4, again with the 
rewarding altruistic seeders versus the tyrannical leeches. We hoped that increasing 
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numbers of altruists might be able to penalize the tyrannical leeches. Unfortunately, 
as shown in Figure 3.10, the tyrannical leeches still had no trouble achieving near 
perfect efficiency. 
We considered the possibility that the leeching nodes would not do so well if the 
altruistic nodes were more stingy during the TFT trading phase. To test this, we 
reconfigured the bandwidth reservation test. In this experiment, the altruists use the 
BitTyrant TFT strategy rather than the default BitTorrent TFT strategy, but still 
perform the incentivized reward seeding. The leech population still practices tyranni-
cal TFT trading and never seeds. The standard population uses standard algorithms 
for both seeding and TFT trading. All other simulation parameters remained the 
same. The results are shown in Figure 3.11. 
Based on these experiments, a rational user might just as well run a tyrannical 
client as an altruistic client. They will receive the same download efficiency and they 
will minimize their upload bandwidth. 
3.5.7 BitTyrant Exploitation 
In the pursuit of finding a weakness in BitTyrant's seemingly anti-social behavior, we 
discovered a problem with BitTyrant's exchange mechanism (also noted by Carra et 
al. [60]). The original BitTyrant paper [25] says: 
As such, BitTyrant continually reduces send rates for peers that recipro-
cate, attempting to find the minimum rate required. Rather than attempt-
ing to ramp up send rates between high capacity peers, BitTyrant tends 
to spread available capacity among many low capacity peers, potentially 
causing inefficiency due to TCP effects. 
To work around this ... effect, BitTyrant advertises itself at connection 
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Figure 3.9 : Altruistic nodes versus tyrants under different amounts of reserved band-
width. 
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Figure 3.11 : Reward-seeding altruists, modified to trade tyrannically before they 
begin seeding, versus tyrant-leeches under different amounts of reserved bandwidth. 
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Figure 3.12 : Median efficiency when altruistic nodes refuse to seed anything to 
tyrannical leech nodes. 
time using the Peer ID hash. Without protocol modification, BitTyrant 
peers recognize one another and switch to a block-based TFT strategy 
that ramps up send rates until capacity is reached. 
The authors believe that their weakness is looking for too many low bandwidth flows, 
or that the many low bandwidth flows are inefficient because of TCP effects. 
To evaluate this, we ran several simulations without the BitTyrant block-level 
TFT component (i.e., we disabled BitTyrant's ability to detect that a peer is also 
running BitTyrant). BitTyrant nodes did very poorly when communicating with each 
other. 
BitTyrant assumes it is receiving reciprocation when it receives an unchoke. This 
is a valid assumption for BitTorrent nodes, but it is not as clear of a signal from 
another BitTyrant node because it does not indicate how much they are willing to 
upload. So, if two BitTyrant nodes unchoke each other, they both assume they have 
an estimate for the minimum upload speed necessary to achieve reciprocation. They 
then both begin to drop their upload rates potentially down to zero in a quest to 
achieve lower estimates for the minimum upload speed. 
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BitTyrant solves this problem by self-identification, disabling the reciprocation-
discovery mechanism because it doesn't really work between two tyrants. This iden-
tification features can be exploited by altruistic nodes to deny service to tyrants! A 
BitTyrant node cannot lie or obscure that it's a tyrant without incurring a penalty 
when trading with other tyrants. 
We re-ran our baseline simulation with 10% altruistic, 70% standard, and 20% 
leech nodes. The altruistic nodes used the normal trade algorithm and our reward 
seeding algorithm. The leech nodes used the BitTyrant trade algorithm. Bandwidth 
was reserved at 75% and the altruistic nodes ignored tyrants during seeding, but 
interacted with them normally when still downloading the torrent. The results are 
shown in Figure 3.12. 
By ignoring tyrants, the altruistic nodes achieve a small but significant perfor-
mance improvement relative to the tyrants. There may well be other ways to exploit 
tyrants, such as refusing to interact with them at all. It is sufficient to say that 
BitTyrant is vulnerable to exploitation, itself, as a consequence of its necessary self-
identification mechanism. 
3.6 Discussion and Future Work 
The development of this research gives rise to a number of important discussion points 
that we will address here. These points include issues relating to the practicality of 
our algorithm to real-life solutions as well as topics of future research. 
Privacy / Anonymity is of significant concern for many BitTorrent users. Natu-
rally, a long-term identifier would impact anonymity. However, the BitTorrent proto-
col was never engineered to provide anonymity to BitTorrent users. (They announce 
their presence to everybody in the swarm, based on their IP address, and adver-
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tise what pieces they have available to trade!) Prom this perspective, a long-term 
identifier is not much worse than an IP address. 
On the other hand, if a Bit Torrent user chose to tunnel Bit Torrent through an 
anonymization system like Tor, then the IP address would be obscured, while the 
long-term identifier would still be advertised. While a number of BitTorrent users 
do tunnel traffic through Tor, their performance will suffer greatly, as Tor was never 
intended to support the kind of massive, sustained traffic flows that BitTorrent can 
generate. Engineering an anonymity service specifically for BitTorrent would be an 
interesting opportunity for future research. 
Bootstrapping and Overlap are the most critical concerns for further develop-
ment of this incentives mechanism. The reward mechanisms in our research depend 
on the same nodes seeing one another, again and again. This may not occur much, 
in the general case, but it could well happen in particular subcommunities. 
Existing Small Groups: A number of relatively small (compared to the entire 
world) communities exist for the purpose of BitTorrent distribution. The traces we 
described in Section 3.4 were collected from f i l e l i s t . org over a three month period. 
This community requires a sign-in name which was associated with each download. 
We observed that 50% of all peers participated in at least two of the same swarms. 
These types of groups would be able to switch over to the seed-rewarding algorithm 
with very little difficulty and would likely have sufficient overlap. 
Social Groups: Existing social communities, brought together by mutual interests 
on social networks, could be used to leverage a relatively small BitTorrent community 
suitable for the seed-rewarding algorithm. 
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Shared Interests: Even without explicit social groupings, one would reasonably 
expect that many people will follow similar patterns. For example, a variety of 
television shows are distributed via Bit Torrent. Users who download the current 
show are likely to download subsequent shows. Similar affinities would be expected 
around other content that is updated on a regular basis, such as updated Linux 
distributions. 
Transitive Trading and similar methods, may be able to ameliorate the need for 
extensive overlap. Transitive trading [49, 61] allows two clients that have never met 
to exchange "credits" through a mutual contact. 
BitTyrant is an important development in BitTorrent because it improves the 
efficiency of certain core concepts. For example, the optimistic unchoke in standard 
BitTorrent trading is a search method for finding better peers, but it simply searches 
randomly. However, as we discussed in Section 3.5.7, BitTyrant clients must identify 
whether they are speaking to other tyrants and change strategies. Otherwise, the 
default BitTyrant TFT strategy will have both clients dropping their bandwidth all 
the way to zero. 
This BitTyrant flaw creates interesting opportunities. Since BitTyrant clients 
must identify themselves as such, they can be trivially ignored by other clients who, 
perhaps, do not with to support their tyrannical behavior. However, there are many 
other options. BitTyrant clients (or, really, any BitTorrent client) could publish 
categorical statements about their unchoking policies. For example a node might 
declare: "If you give me at least X bytes per second, then I'll unchoke you and give 
you X in return, up to Y bytes per second max." Of course, a tyrant could lie about 
such policies, but it creates an interesting opportunity for future research, both in 
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terms of simulation studies and in terms of economic modeling. 
Carra et al. [60] also examined the strengths of BitTyrant-style behavior versus 
simply expanding the number of simultaneous connections in traditional Bit Torrent 
clients by simulation. However, their simulation models ignored churn and other 
real-world conditions leading us to believe that their results are unreliable. 
3.7 Related Work 
open The BitTorrent protocol and associated algorithms were introduced by Cohen 
in 2003 [1] with a reference client implementation. A fluid model for the system was 
given by Qiu et al. [62], who used it to show that in certain cases a Nash equilibrium 
can exist in systems where peers choose upload rates to match their download rates. 
Studies performed on emulated swarms by Legout et al. [28] validated the effectiveness 
of the BitTorrent unchoking algorithm. Legout et al. [63] also concluded from real-
world tests that the rarest-first algorithm is very important to system performance, 
and argued that the default unchoking algorithm provides adequate robustness from 
free-riders. 
A fluid-model simulator was used by Bharambe et al. [57] to represent a BitTorrent 
system in a more abstract manner than our own. They confirmed the utility of the 
rarest-first policy for piece selection. They also investigated unfairness with respect to 
volume uploaded and argued that the rate-based TFT strategy fails to prevent such 
unfairness, especially in systems with a great disparity of bandwidth among peers. 
They proposed a new block-level, volume-based TFT trading algorithm, although 
subsequent researchers challenged its effectiveness [63]. 
De Vogeleer et al. [64], made an event-based simulator for BitTorrent based on 
the algorithms in the reference implementation and used it to model a variety of typ-
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ical swarm scenarios, verifying the performance characteristics against the expected 
behavior of a standard BitTorrent client. 
A simulation-based study by Eger et al. [58] compared flow-level and packet-level 
simulations for BitTorrent-like systems and found that, while flow-level simulations 
are useful for demonstrating the theoretic performance of the de facto BitTorrent 
scheme, the delay of TCP packets and other cross-layer effects have a significant im-
pact on BitTorrent performance, and these effects require a more granular simulation 
to be adequately captured. 
Much research has been performed concerning the robustness of BitTorrent's tit-
for-tat trading mechanism against selfish behaviors. BitTorrent was modeled as a form 
of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma problem by Jun et al. [65], who suggested that the 
current peer-selection algorithm is susceptible to free-riders; they proposed a different 
TFT strategy. Tian et al. [26] used mathematical models as well as simulation-based 
and real-world experiments to argue for a modified TFT algorithm. 
Sirivianos et al. [27] emulated a strictly free-riding client which contacts the tracker 
often to gain a large neighborhood from which to free-ride; they concluded that this 
attack was feasible in practice. Liogkas et al. [28] use PlanetLab to demonstrate three 
different exploits: downloading from seeds, downloading from the fastest peers, and 
advertising fake pieces. 
3.8 Conclusion 
At present, BitTorrent's seeding mechanism is entirely altruistic; nodes have no ra-
tional reason to offer seeding service to their peers, yet the additional bandwidth 
provided by seeding is essential to the efficient operation of BitTorrent. Anything 
that can encourage seeding would have an immediate knock-on benefit for BitTorrent 
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users. 
In this work, we have proposed a method for rewarding seeding in BitTorrent by 
means of long-term identification. Nodes remember peers that seeded to them in the 
past and reciprocate by seeding to them in later swarms. 
To evaluate our algorithm and its parameter space, we developed and employed a 
flow-level simulator. The algorithm was tested on realistic file-sizes and trace-driven 
churn to improve its accuracy. We found that our algorithm improved the download 
efficiency of the BitTorrent nodes from 70% to 95% or better. This improvement 
represents the upper bound of our algorithm's performance and was based on oracular 
knowledge that would not be available in real scenarios. We tested more realistic 
settings and found that our algorithm could still increase the download efficiency by 
ten percentage points. 
Finally, we evaluated our seed-rewarding algorithm in swarms that had some por-
tion of the population running Bit Tyrant, a variant on BitTorrent that is aggressive 
about getting fast downloads with minimal investments of upload bandwidth. We 
found that our algorithm could protect nodes from being exploited by Bit Tyrant, but 
could not sufficiently penalize tyrannical behavior to discourage users from choosing 
to run BitTyrant. However, leveraging a weakness in BitTyrant, where BitTyrant 
nodes must identify themselves as such, we can ignore tyrants during seeding and 
reduce their performance. 
So long as BitTorrent peers have sufficient overlap in successive swarms, allow-
ing them to build individual long-term histories of who has seeded in the past, we 
conclude that BitTorrent peers using our incentivized reward seeding algorithm will 
enjoy better performance for themselves and also improve performance for their peers, 
whether running our algorithm or not. By adding in our mechanism, for which peers 
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have a genuine incentive to follow, we can build better robustness in Bit Torrent. 
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Chapter 4 
BitTorrent Anonymity Marketplace 
The very nature of operations in peer-to-peer systems such as BitTorrent exposes 
information about participants to their peers. Nodes desiring anonymity, therefore, 
often chose to route their peer-to-peer traffic through anonymity relays, such as Tor. 
Unfortunately, these relays have little incentive for contribution and struggle to scale 
with the high loads that P2P traffic foists upon them. We propose a novel modification 
for BitTorrent that we call the BitTorrent Anonymity Marketplace. Peers in our 
system trade in k swarms obscuring the actual intent of the participants. But because 
peers can cross-trade torrents, the k — 1 cover traffic can actually serve a useful 
purpose. This creates a system wherein a neighbor cannot determine if a node actually 
wants a given torrent, or if it is only using it as leverage to get the one it really wants. 
In this chapter, we present our design, explore its operation in simulation, and analyze 
its effectiveness. We demonstrate that the upload and download characteristics of 
cover traffic and desired torrents are statistically difficult to distinguish. 
4.1 Introduction 
Peer-to-peer file transfer protocols, such as the very popular BitTorrent [1] protocol, 
provide massively scalable architectures for distributing large files. Unfortunately, 
privacy is a direct casualty of the peer cooperation that drives them. For traditional 
client-server architectures, the client need only trust the server not to reveal to addi-
tional parties the details of the transaction. While some information is revealed just 
58 
from observing that the client and server communicated with each other, the specifics 
are confidential. With appropriate cryptographic and protocol mechanisms, the client 
can have strong assurances of privacy in the transaction so long as the server remains 
trusted. 
On the other hand, in peer-to-peer cooperation, an individual, by necessity, reveals 
details of the transaction to many parties, each of which must be trusted if privacy is 
to be maintained. This problem is exacerbated by the nature of peers in such systems. 
In the client-server model a user can limit interactions to well-known, vetted servers, 
but in contemporary p2p systems peers could be controlled by an incompetent or 
malicious individual or organization. 
A number of solutions to the peer-to-peer anonymity problem have been proposed. 
The most common solution in practice is to route traffic through anonymity relays 
such as Tor [34]. Unfortunately, Tor has, by default, no incentives for cooperation 
and struggles to scale with P2P workloads. Our goal at the onset of this research 
was to develop an anonymity mechanism for BitTorrent that incentivizes participa-
tion and induces scalability. Such a mechanism would provide better performance 
than BitTorrent-over-Tor while still providing sufficient anonymity guarantees. Fur-
thermore, it would draw BitTorrent users away from the Tor network and all parties 
would be better off. 
We have created the BitTorrent Anonymity Marketplace as novel solution to this 
problem. This system provides genuine incentives for nodes to participate in cross 
trading of multiple swarms obscuring the actual intent of the driving nodes creating 
what we refer to as k-traffic-anonymity. We demonstrate in simulation the effective-
ness of this obfuscation and show that it has nearly optimal performance tradeoffs. 
Our result is distinguished from other BitTorrent specific anonymity solutions either 
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because participation is incentivized, or because the attack model we address is more 
powerful. 
This chapter is organized as follows. We first review some of the operations of 
Bit Torrent and some of the principles of incentives in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3 we 
review the current solution space to the p2p anonymity problem. Then we introduce 
our own objectives and design in Section 4.4. We evaluate our results in Section 4.5. 
Finally, we close with a discussion of our research in Section 4.6 and our conclusions 
in Section 4.7. 
4.2 Background 
4.2.1 BitTorrent 
BitTorrent [1] is a highly successful and popular peer-to-peer protocol that enables 
efficient, rapid distribution of potentially large amounts of data to a group of clients. It 
utilizes the available upload bandwidth of the participants to scale to support many 
users. Most important, it has built-in incentives mechanisms that reward correct 
participation. 
To make an item available for BitTorrent downloading, a publisher makes avail-
able a tracker and at least one seed. The tracker follows the nodes participating in 
the swarm, helping nodes locate their peers. Seed provide round-robbin, best-effort 
service to all connecting peers. 
To download the object, a group of nodes, collectively called the swarm join the 
system by contacting the tracker, indicating their intent to participate. The tracker 
informs joining nodes of random subsets of their peers. The nodes then establish 
direct connections with these subsets forming their local neighborhoods. Thus joined, 
the nodes download the object in equal sized chunks of the file called pieces. Nodes 
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share information with their neighborhood about the pieces they have available and 
update them as new pieces are acquired. 
Nodes, however, limit the number of peers in their neighborhood that can down-
load from them at any given time. They evaluate their peers based on how much each 
has recently uploaded. The node then provides download service to the top three or 
four contributors. Each node also provides service to one or two random nodes as 
a method of searching the neighborhood for better partners. Thus, peers have an 
incentive to contribute to their neighbors in order to receive reciprocal contributions 
from their neighbors in turn. When a node decides to service a peer, it is said to 
unchoke the peer. Conversely, when it will no longer serve the peer, it is said to choke 
it. Once a peer is unchoked, it can send Request messages asking for data. If the 
unchoking node refuses, the peer considers itself snubbed and will not do business 
with that node for some time. Nodes update their peers with Have messages when a 
new piece is received so that the neighborhood keeps abreast of what a node can and 
cannot trade. 
While a significant corpus of research has demonstrated that Bit Torrent can be 
exploited [25, 26, 27, 28], BitTorrent continues to work well in practice. The incentives 
in BitTorrent are sufficient, at present, for keeping the system stable. Indeed, while 
there is no consensus on the true amount of BitTorrent data in-flight today, it is clear 
that the number is large at somewhere between one-third and one-half of all Internet 
traffic [30, 31, 32, 53]. 
4.2.2 Incentives 
Peer-to-peer systems' greatest strength is their lack of centralization. At the same 
time, this lack of centralization makes enforcement of peer behavior difficult. In 
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general, the system designers intend for peers to behave in a certain way, but peers 
may choose to behave differently. Most nodes are assumed to be rational, or self-
interested, and want to maximize their benefit from the system while simultaneously 
minimizing their own contributions. Faithfulness is the measure of a node's obedience 
to designer specification. By definition, rational nodes are only faithful if it is in their 
own interest, and, therefore, faithfulness can only be achieved by designing systems 
with proper incentives [15, 23]. 
In previous work, we identified two general classes of incentives in peer-to-peer 
systems: artificial and genuine [56]. Genuine incentives are characterized by being 
an intrinsic property of the p2p protocol, whereas artificial incentives are a super-
imposition of reward and punishment on top of an unincnentivized system. The 
intrinsic nature of genuine incentives makes them more robust to rational manipula-
tions and are, therefore, preferred. 
4.3 Related Work 
A number of solutions to the peer-to-peer anonymity problem exist or have been 
proposed. We briefly outline some of these approaches here. 
4.3.1 Tor 
Tor [34] is distributed network of relays operated by volunteers that allows clients to 
route network traffic through them to disguise the true origin. If used properly, the 
client's identity and physical location are kept hidden from other entities. Per-relay 
encryption also provides anonymity against wire-traces and packet sniffing. Each 
relay is allowed to define its own policy about what it will and will not do for the 
network. Entry routers, as the name implies, accept traffic from outside the Tor 
network. Conversely, exit routers allow traffic out to the true destination. Middle 
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routers only relay traffic within Tor itself. 
A node that desires anonymity computes an onion route through the Tor network. 
It encrypts its packet with a layer of encryption for each router in the network. Each 
intermediate node peels off a layer of encryption, and forwards the traffic to the next 
hop. Each node only knows the preceding and subsequent steps in the route. The 
nodes cannot be sure if the packet they are receiving is from the original sender, or 
simply a relay in the route. 
Measurements taken in [35] indicate that 40% of the traffic from a sample Tor exit 
node was used for BitTorrent indicating how popular Tor is for providing Bit Torrent 
anonymity. 
Despite Tor's usefulness, it does struggle with a significant problem. It has trouble 
encouraging participants to contribute new computers to serve in the Tor network, 
impacting Tor's ability to scale with the traffic it receives. Additional nodes also 
strengthen anonymity. However, the value of serving as a relay to a user is unclear; 
it has no impact on the quality of service that they observe from the Tor network. 
Consequently, most users choose not to contribute. 
Another important observation is that any negative legal or social response result-
ing from the originator's connection will be borne by the exit node. Consequently, 
many nodes have a strict disincentive to not serve as an exit node. 
Artificial Incentives for Tor Recently, researchers have proposed extending Tor 
with incentives for better participation. One proposal [66] is to create a central au-
thority that tracks each node's contributions and publicizes their good behavior so 
that other nodes can reward them. Alternatively, other research proposes micropay-
ments, where Tor users may buy a higher quality of service [67]. 
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4.3.2 BitTorent Specific Solutions 
In addition to the Tor general anonymity network, anonymity mechanisms have been 
proposed that are specific to BitTorrent. 
BitBlender [36] extends BitTorrent to route traffic through peers in an anonymity 
directory. In a fashion similar to Tor, members of the swarm can forward requests 
through other peers providing a form of anonymity it calls "A;-anonymity." They 
define this as "users are indistinguishable from a set of k users." Unfortunately, as 
with Tor, BitBlender provides no incentive for nodes to offer relay services. Please 
note that fc-anonymity in their system is not the same as ^-traffic anonymity in this 
chapter. 
OneSwarm [37] attempts to solve the BitTorrent anonymity problem more gener-
ally. Nodes have extensive control over what information about themselves they will 
share and with whom. In particular, OneSwarm would be used with social network-
ing so that information is only shared with "friends." OneSwarm does not solve the 
problem of maintaining anonymity in large groups of untrusted peers. 
SwarmScreen [38], in a fashion similar to our work, proposes anonymity through 
the use of cover traffic. In particular, they assert that nodes achieve plausible deniabil-
ity "by simply adding a small percent (between 25 and 50%) of additional random con-
nections that are statistically indistinguishable from natural ones." SwarmScreen's 
attack model has an observer classify nodes based on the behavior of the community 
they participate in. Its stated goal is the disrupting of these "guilt-by-association" 
attacks, or in other words, obscuring the community that a node is participating with 
at any given point in time. We will make further comparisons to SwarmScreen as we 
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outline our own solution. Our work is only superficially similar. 
4.4 Design 
Our objectives for this work break down into three categories: anonymity, perfor-
mance, and incentives. As we detail our objectives, we will compare and contrast our 
solution with SwarmScreen to illustrate the differences in approach and philosophy. 
Our primary goal is an obfuscation of participant behavior that we call k-traffic-
anonymity. Nodes in our system must have an indistinguishability of intent as they 
are observed by their peers. In other words, a node's peers can see that they are 
downloading k items but cannot distinguish which one of them the node picked in-
tentionally. The intentionally picked torrent is called the native interest. 
Our primary threat: observers wish to ascertain a target node's native interest. 
We call the attacker an inquisitor and define three different classes of attacks. Fully 
passive inquisitors do not contact any other peers. Instead, these nodes exclusively 
scan the tracker's data on where nodes are participating. Decoy passive inquisitors do 
contact peers and can appearance to participate. They may lie and announce piece 
reception, make requests for pieces from their peers, and in any other way appear to be 
normal nodes, but they will not actually accept downloads or make uploads. Finally, 
Active inquisitors can participate and behave like any other node in the system. 
Within our anonymity constraints, we want good performance. We will measure 
performance in terms of the number of additional download bytes required to achieve 
a given level of anonymity. In an idealized world where all torrents are the same 
size, optimal performance for fc-tramc-anonymity is k times the number of bytes in 
a torrent. In other words, the node downloads exactly k torrents and nothing more. 
Our objective is nearly optimal performance; we are not interested in designs, for 
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example, that require 2k or more download cost for fc-traffic-anonymity. 
Finally, our last objective is that the incentives structure of our system encourages 
full participation of the rational nodes. The critical incentive that we identify is that 
participating in a torrent, purely for anonymity reasons, can still offer performance 
benefits. This is important for two reasons connected with anonymity. First, to do 
otherwise would create a system wherein some torrents might only ever have natively 
interested nodes downloading it. This is a form of anonymity starvation. Second, if 
there is no value to the cover-traffic torrents in the download set, an inquisitor might 
be able to distinguish the native-interest in the set. By creating a system where all 
torrents can be valuable as cover-traffic, nodes have incentives to participate in them 
preventing torrent starvation and obscuring the native interests of the participants. 
We emphasize that this is a genuine incentive, requiring no additional enforcement 
mechanisms or auditing. 
In contrast, SwarmScreen is interested in a much weaker attack model. They 
showed that BitTorrent communities tend to form around interests rather than around 
language, geography, or even friendship. They further showed that these communi-
ties can be monitored and classified by observing a small number of the nodes. The 
describe this invasion of privacy as "guilt by association" attacks. Finally, the also 
demonstrated that monitoring just 1% of the network is sufficient for assigning users 
to their communities with 86% accuracy. They solve this attack model by mixing in 
traffic to other random torrents to obscure which community a SwarmScreen partic-
ipant belongs to. Defeating this simpler attack model only costs them 25% to 50% 
overhead. 
However, the stronger attack model we defeat with our system is worth the in-
creased cost. An observer that can follow a SwarmScreen node for a long period 
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of time can easily determine which torrents the node was downloading, because the 
node never fully downloads the torrents it uses as cover traffic. At the same time, 
our system also disrupts the guilt by association attack as described. 
BitTorrent Anonymity Marketplace, High-Level Design. Our basic system 
works for any given k level of anonymity. First, each node participates in k different 
torrents simultaneously. It advertises all k torrents, hereafter called its active set, to 
its local neighborhood. While the composition of the active set can change over time, 
it must eventually completely download k complete torrents (we will call these the 
download set), or else a long-term observer could immediately filter out the cover-
traffic. 
Our design also requires that nodes will "cross trade" their torrents, i.e., a node 
unchoke its peers' requests for any torrent, not just the torrents where a node has 
benefited from its peers. In our design, a node will consider every possible torrent it 
sees advertised by its peers, and will prefer to join those torrents which it believes 
will be most beneficial in its quest to download its native interest. 
The design of our valuation function is drawn from models of supply and demand 
in economics [68]. In general, the value of a torrent to a node is raised by increased 
numbers of peers that desire it, while the value is lowered by increased numbers of 
peers that provide it. Unfortunately, it is impossible to directly measure a torrent's 
supply and demand in BitTorent, and so we use several factors to approximate this. 
These factors include how much of the torrent the peer requires to complete it, Have 
announcements indicating what it is currently trading, and direct Request messages 
to measure what is available. 
We highlight that our valuation function was derived from empirical data and 
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not an economic or mathematical model. Developing a coherent economic valuation 
function is a significant research undertaking in and of itself and is beyond the scope 
of this chapter. Our experimental version was constructed by taking the factors 
that impact the value of a torrent and combining them in a weighted sum. This 
construction, similar to how utility functions are built [69], enabled us to experiment 
with different weights for the factors by dialing up or down the constant associated 
with that variable. Later in this chapter, we will detail our derivation of our constants 
from experimentation. 
The critical hypothesis tested in this work is whether using a valuation function on 
torrents will drive node behavior such that protocol exchanges related to the native 
interest are statistically indistinguishable from protocol exchanges for cover traffic. 
The core idea is that a peer has no idea if a node is asking for pieces of a torrent 
because it actually wants it, or if it is just asking for those pieces because it has a 
high value due to the neighborhood's "market" conditions. 
4.5 Evaluation 
We employed a simulator developed in previous research [70] to evaluate our imple-
mentation of the BitTorrent Anonymity Marketplace. The simulator, running faster 
than real-time, enabled fast design cycles. After completing a simulation, we studied 
the results, modified the configuration, and re-ran our experiments. This was a sig-
nificant advantage over using an artificial environment such as PlanetLab or EmuLab 
to run a "real" BitTorrent client. Simulation is also preferred to releasing a client to 
public users because it allows us better access to system and client state information 
and it avoids any potential legal or ethical issues we are not yet prepared to confront. 
68 
4.5.1 Implementation 
Our client implementation was developed to be as realistic as possible in all stages 
of their operation. One notable departure from a stock BitTorrent system is that we 
assume the presence of a distributed hash table (DHT) in which to store metadata, 
rather than the more limited tracker functionality in the current BitTorrent. What 
follows is an overview of how nodes participate in the Marketplace. 
Publishing. It is essential that objects exchanged in the Marketplace are opaque 
to users that are uninterested in them. Otherwise, users may choose not to trade 
in objects they deem overly sensitive. For this reason, all content is encrypted and 
assigned random identifiers. We assume out-of-band methods (e.g., publisher web 
servers) help users discover specific torrents and obtain the decryption keys. In this 
manner, participating nodes will trade in many torrents without any knowledge of 
their content, except for their own native interest, thus obtaining a modicum of 
plausible deniability. Once a publisher has encrypted the object and created its 
random ID, it stores a record similar to a torrent-file into the DHT and announces 
nodes that are seeding the torrent within the DHT. 
Messages. All inter-peer communication consists of unmodified BitTorrent mes-
sages with one exception. While normal BitTorrent Choke and Unchoke messages 
identify a specific torrent, in the Marketplace these messages are not torrent-specific. 
These two messages instead signal that the sender is willing or unwilling to fulfill 
requests for any of the torrents it has currently advertised. 
Joining. To use the BitTorrent Anonymity Marketplace, a participant first acquires 
the random ID for the desired object, as described earlier. Next, the node joins the 
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DHT and requests a list of active torrents. From this list, the node creates a list 
of k torrents consisting of its desired torrent plus k — 1 randomly selected torrents. 
The node then indicates to the DHT that it is joining those k torrents and requests 
participating peers. The node creates a neighborhood from these lists, preferring 
peers that show up in multiple torrents. 
Trading. After nodes join the system, they unchoke peers in a manner similar to 
BitTorrent with the highest upload services getting the unchoke slots. However, in 
the Marketplace, all upload service is adjusted by the estimated value of the received 
pieces. Our implementation keeps the value constant across an entire torrent, al-
though different pieces could ostensibly have different values. Once the values of the 
upload services are adjusted, unchoking proceeds normally. At the same time, if the 
node can find a more valuable torrent than the least valuable torrent in its active set, 
it drops that torrent and joins the new one. 
Seeding and Termination. A Marketplace participant must complete k down-
loads before leaving the system. Before all k torrents have completed, a node may 
find value in seeding one of its completed torrents, depending on its observations of 
the supply and demand for those torrents. Alternately, it could forgo seeding and 
instead look for more profitable ways to trade its available bandwidth. 
4.5.2 Development of the Valuation Function 
We have developed a valuation function based on reasonable economic assumptions, 
refined by experimentation, and suitable for enabling our evaluation of our anonymity 
objectives. We started with basic supply and demand concepts [68]. In other words, 
we accept the assumption that increased desire and scarcity raise the value of a given 
70 
object, while decreased desire and abundance reduce the value of same. In terms of 
the BitTorrent Anonymity Marketplace, the number of nodes wishing to download a 
pieces of a torrent constitute the desire, and the nodes that can service those requests 
constitute the supply. These two factors are the basis for our valuation function. 
Unfortunately, the node cannot measure these factors directly and must therefore 
estimate them. For example, a node sees all the peers within its neighborhood, but 
it cannot see further. It cannot see every peer participating in every torrent, thus 
it cannot determine the global supply and demand of torrent pieces, nor even can it 
determine any other peer's view of this data. To estimate supply, Marketplace nodes 
treat what they can see, within their own neighborhood, as an estimate for what their 
peers can see. (Neighborhood visibility is not transitive. If A is in B's neighborhood 
and B is in C's neighborhood, there is no guarantee that A knows anything about 
C.) Nodes can make a better estimate about the demand for a torrent by totaling 
the number of pieces required for their peers. They then combine these two estimates 
into a single factor hereafter referred to as approximate demand over supply. 
In addition to this information, BitTorrent nodes can make use of the Have 
announcements and Request messages from peers to know more about demand in 
the neighborhood. The Have messages indicate a degree of freshness to what tor-
rents neighbors are trading and, of course, Request messages are the strongest, most 
straight-forward measure of demand available. 
Our early valuation function was a weighted sum of these three factors. Using 
this construction, each factor could be experimentally measured to determine if it 
had an impact at all, and the ideal weighting could be derived experimentally using 
our simulations. By fixing a weight of 1 to all but one factors, the remaining factor 
can be evaluated independently. Setting this experimental factor to 0, for example, 
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completely eliminates its impact on the function. 
For testing the Marketplace, we fixed k = 5, set the total number of torrents in the 
marketplace to 40, initiated 100 clients plus 40 seeds, and used 125 MB files for each 
torrent*. For simplicity, all the clients have the same upload and download speeds 
of 1Mbps, start at the same time, and end when their k downloads are complete. 
To test the effects of torrent popularity, we configured 10% of the torrents to be the 
native interest of 50% of the clients. 
Our initial simulations immediately demonstrated that our initial valuation func-
tion was insufficient. Regardless of configuration, the clients in the simulation would 
not complete their downloads. We determined that the nodes were dropping the 
torrents in their active set, regardless of how much they had completed, for a new 
torrent that was surging in popularity in their neighborhood. We decreased the fre-
quency at which nodes would update their active set but that didn't solve the problem 
sufficiently. 
After some additional experimentation, we determined that because one of the 
goals of the node is to complete k downloads, the completeness of a torrent should 
factor into the valuation function. In other words, if all other factors are equal, a more 
complete torrent should be valued higher than a less complete one. We retooled the 
valuation function with this new factor and re-ran the simulations and were rewarded 
with converging results. 
Using our more mature valuation function, we tested the factors in the function 
independently. For each factor tested, we experimented with weights of 0, 0.25, 0.5, 
0.75, 1.0, 2.0, 4.0, 8.0 and 16.0. For completeness, we also tested a few other non-
* Individually 125 MB is a small file for BitTorrent, but because our nodes are exchanging five 
files simultaneously, the amount of data in transit is 625MB per client. 
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value related variables such as how often the node updates its active set, and so forth. 
In total, we ran fifty different different configurations of the simulator, again fixing 
all but one factor at a time and varying it across this broad range of weights. 
These tests demonstrated, again, that biases toward completing torrents that 
have been started are essential, and that data collected from direct requests is the 
best proxy for overall demand. When we reconfigured the simulation to ignore direct 
requests, performance worsened by nearly twenty percent. Interestingly, the remain-
ing factors proved to be much poorer estimates of demand and had little impact on 
average performance. However, they are useful to a node at times when the node has 
not recently received any such requests. A small weight for these factors was better 
than no weight at all. We conclude that when the direct request factor is in play, 
it should dominate the equation. However, when the direct request factor drops to 
zero, these weaker factors serve as a backup. 
While the specific coefficients of valuation function are optimized for our simula-
tion configuration and are thus not directly applicable for a real-world deployment, 
the insights obtained from this empirical evaluation are still essential. Moreover, we 
can now test our central hypothesis: will cross-trading nodes that use a valuation func-
tion to decide which cover-traffic nodes to trade have the A;-traffic-indistinguishability 
property? 
4.5.3 Anonymity Results 
To evaluate anonymity, we took the best observed weight for each of the valuation fac-
tors and reconfigured the simulator appropriately. With this valuation configuration, 
we ran twenty simulations. Each took several hours to complete on a 2.4 Ghz Athlon 
and covered approximately 7 hours of simulation time. Each run involved about 
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70GB of simulated data transfer and approximately 10 million control messages. The 
simulations output logs that detail the data transfers and control messages and we 
used them to trace how the peers interacted with each other as well as to calculate 
costs and determine performance. 
Our primary goal was to quantify indistinguishability of intent. This property 
means that a node downloading 1 native interest, and k — 1 cover traffic torrents will 
not reveal its native interest by its behavior to its peers. We will examine three node 
behaviors that could potentially reveal the native interest to peers: start times for 
torrents, end times for torrents, and download patterns. 
Start Time. We first evaluate the indistinguishability of start times, where start 
time is measured as an integer rank. In other words, the first torrent that a node 
makes requests for is ranked 1, and the second torrent that a node makes requests for 
is ranked 2, and so on. We evaluated this aspect of indistinguishability in two ways. 
First, we checked that there was sufficient variability of start times for native 
interests. It is important, of course, that native interests not have a predictable start 
rank. Our results are shown in Figure 4.1. The graph is parameterized on the number 
of nodes natively interested in the torrent, as a measure of popularity. The y axis is 
the average start rank for nodes of that popularity and the standard deviation. The 
graph shows that the standard deviation is high for start rank, so a node's native 
interests are suitably obscured from its peers. 
Our second measure of the indistinguishability of start times is to measure the 
average start time for the same torrent for peers that are natively interested relative 
to peers that are not (see Figure 4.2). There is a noticeable shift to earlier start 
times for native interests. Nevertheless, the average times for the native interests 
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Figure 4.1 : The mean start rank of native interests plotted against popularity. The 
x-axis is the number of peers natively interested in the torrent, the y-axis is the 
starting rank. The error bars show the standard deviation. The wide standard 
deviations mean that native interests have a wide range of start rank. 
lie within the standard deviations of the start times for non-native interests. The 
distributions are not statistically different enough to be detectable. Furthermore, the 
native and non-native graphs have similar shapes, suggesting similar behavior for the 
two populations. 
End Time. It is also important that native interests not end predictably. Express-
ing end times as integer ranks, we evaluated the variability of native end times in 
Figure 4.3 and compared those times to non-native end times in Figure 4.4. These 
graphs show that, as with start times, there is a wide variability in the end times and 
that the mean is within the standard deviation of cover-traffic start times. 
Download Rates Over Time. Finally, we examined the rate of piece transmis-
sions for native and non-native populations in the Marketplace to verify that trans-
mission patterns are indistinguishable. We created our transmission pattern by ag-
gregating each node's download volume within 500 second buckets. All nodes are 
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Figure 4.2 : The mean start rank of the various torrents plotted against the start 
rank for the same torrent for peers not natively interested. This graph shows that 
native interests do start sooner, but the mean lies within the standard deviation of 
non-native interest start times for most torrents. 
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Figure 4.3 : Similar to Figure 4.1, this graph shows the mean ending ranks and the 
standard deviation. As with start times, end times vary sufficiently to make them 
poor predictors of interest. 
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Figure 4.4 : The mean end ranks for native interest compare to mean end ranks for 
non-native interest. As before, there is a noticeable shift downwards, but, as before, 
the means for the native interests tend to lie within the standard deviations of the 
non-native interests. 
normalized such that their first 500 second slice of time is slice 0, the second 500 
seconds is slice 1, and so forth. Within each slice, we separated the download volume 
for the native interest from the average download volume for the cover-traffic. The 
average for all nodes and the standard deviations are computed for each time slice. 
Figure 4.5 shows the download pattern for all nodes across the entire simulation. We 
again observe that the nodes' averages for native traffic is within the standard devi-
ation of the cover-traffic. Note also that this graph represents a global view over all 
nodes, so this any node's local view would have higher error. 
We can examine a weaker observer by computing the observed download patterns 
for a single client. That is, for each node, we aggregated all the traffic that only that 
node observed directly. As before, we aggregated into 500 second buckets, dividing 
the native interest traffic from cover traffic. Then we used the average and standard 
deviations for each node's observed patterns to create Figure 4.6. The two types of 
traffic overlap even more in this graph, demonstrating that a single peer observes 
less differences between native interest traffic and cover traffic then can be observed 
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across the swarm as a whole. 
4.5.4 Analysis 
We now revisit anonymity against each of the inquisitors that we previously identified. 
Passive Inquisitor. These nodes do not directly interact with any actual nodes 
but only talk to the tracker or DHT. The passive inquisitor can, at best, track a 
given node's active set. Prom this information, it cannot determine the node's native 
interest. As we demonstrated, the entrance and exits of a given torrent in a node's 
active set appear indistinguishable, regardless of the torrent's status as native interest. 
Decoy Passive Inquisitor. These nodes directly interact with other nodes, but 
do not actually exchange pieces. They can, however, advertise pieces and unchoke 
other nodes. Such inquisitors gain additional information, because rational nodes will 
drop them regularly for their poor performance. However, with a Sybil attack [40], 
these nodes can connect to a given node over and over from different IP addresses, 
simulating a continuous connection. Such a Sybil attack could track the traffic of 
a rational node by capturing all Have announcements. Nevertheless, even a Sybil 
attacker will not determine the node's native interest from this information because, 
as we demonstrated, the download rates for a given torrent for a node are similar, 
regardless of the node's native or non-native interest in that torrent. 
Active Inquisitor. The most powerful non-wiretap node, these nodes actively 
trade with peers in the network. This feature allows them to attempt to "trick" 
a victim node into revealing state through carefully crafted trading. For example, an 
active inquisitor might obtain a large number of blocks from all the nodes in active 
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Figure 4.5 : Native and non-native traffic patterns super-imposed. While native traffic 
is above non-native traffic for the same node, the median for the native is within the 
standard deviation of the other. 
set. Then, it might selectively advertise these blocks to the victim to see which blocks 
the victim takes a higher interest in. Furthermore, a very well provisioned inquisitor 
might introduce identifiable torrents into the marketplace that it can use to manip-
ulate torrent values within a neighborhood. The active inquisitor can use such value 
manipulation to attempt to pierce the indistinguishability. 
At present, we have not yet attempted to simulate active inquisitors. Nevertheless, 
we expect that unless the inquisitor can control a large portion of a victim node's 
local neighborhood (e.g., using a Sybil attack), it cannot have high confidence about 
the motivation for a node's interest in any given torrent. This attack, however, is 
made non-trivial because DHTs or trackers give out random subsets of the peers to 
a participating node, thus dramatically increasing the costs of overtaking a node's 
neighborhood. Nevertheless, Sybil attacks are a significant security issue and remains 
a point of research. 
In addition to our successful anonymity results, we also quantified the costs in 
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Figure 4.6 : This figure is similar to Figure 4.5 but limited to the viewpoint of single 
clients. In other words, the former figure is a global representation of download 
patterns, while this figure is representative of what a single peer observes. 
these simulations. The amount of data downloaded, expressed as a multiple of a 
single torrent, averaged 5.71 ± 0.43 Given that the optimal value is 5, this indicates 
that our nodes are not wasting a lot of time downloading torrents that they do not 
complete. 
To conclude our evaluation, we review our incentives qualitatively along two of 
three axes suggested by previous work [15, 23]. We now consider incentives for com-
munication and incentives for computation. There is no need to evaluate incentives 
for message passing because the Marketplace, as in regular BitTorrent, does not have 
peers relay messages for one another. 
Incentives for Communication. The first question is, does a rational node have 
any incentive to lie about its state? 
1. Active Torrents: The only incentive for a node to lie about its active set is 
for increased anonymity against passive inquisitors. However, we have demon-
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strated that the native interest of a node is not revealed by the makeup and 
dynamics of the active set. Furthermore, the active set is necessary for perfor-
mance and anonymity. Therefore, there is no incentive to lie about this state. 
2. Choke Status: There is no incentive for a rational node to misinform a neigh-
bor about the choke state between them. A lie about choke status might result 
in a snub, which is undesirable. 
3. Piece-Interest Status: The incentives to lie about this are unclear. There 
is an incentive for a node to announce that it has pieces, even for pieces it 
does not actually have because the value of the torrent in the marketplace will 
increase. On the other hand, unchoked neighbors may ask for these pieces and 
subsequently snub the lying node when it cannot produce them. We have not yet 
quantified these incentives, but snubing is undesirable, providing a disincentive 
to this behavior. 
4. Piece Requests: A node has an incentive to request pieces that it already 
has in order to drive the value of the torrent higher. However, it also affects 
the value of torrents by pretending not to have the piece. Requesting pieces 
already present costs additional bandwidth, which is valuable and limited, so 
that behavior is certainly disincentived. Similarly, pretending not to have a 
piece means that a peer who might have something to trade might skip over 
this node. As with core BitTorrent, Marketplace nodes have an incentive to 
participate normally in torrent trading such that they get what they want in 
an efficient manner. 
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Incentives for Computation. We next ask, does a rational node have any in-
centive to compute a non-conforming value for torrents in the marketplace? The 
answer is no, by definition, because nodes will compute their own market valuations. 
Theoretically, all nodes have an incentive to develop effective methods of evaluating 
torrents of non-native interest. The cooperation model supports and encourages this 
form of self-interested operation. 
In summary, the Marketplace is built on a sound foundation of incentives, although 
some small components are currently manipulable, and aggressive Sybil attacks may 
be able to weaken the anonymity guarantees. These are open problems for future 
research. 
4.6 Discussion and Future Work 
Our proposal of the Bit Torrent Anonymity Marketplace is a valuable contribution to 
p2p-anonymity, particularly if an implementation of it could draw away traffic from 
Tor. However, our work has produced many more questions than it has answered. 
4.6.1 Stronger Anonymity and Ethical Issues 
Our anonymity model is designed to shroud a peer's intentions from the observations 
of its neighbors. However, many Bit Torrent users would be interested in shrouding 
their intentions from adversaries that can tap their wire, such as their ISP. The Bit-
Torrent Anonymity Marketplace could potentially be hardened to improve anonymity 
in such cases when the adversary can tap the peer's line. 
Per-peer encryption. Peers can communicate with one another via encrypted 
links, an optional feature already present in BitTorrent. This immediately hides the 
message exchanges that divulge the Marketplace's state. Despite this link encryption, 
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an adversary would still have access to the public information in the DHT. 
Late-start native interest. A node does not need to connect to its native interest 
upon initialization. Instead, it can choose its fc-active set randomly, which may or 
may not include the native interest. If not present in the initial active set, the node 
can rotate it into activity at a later time. 
Even split peers. Because our system biases a node's selection of its peers based 
on the value of the torrents they are trading, an observer could approximate the value 
of each torrent to the node based on its neighbor selection. Nodes could remove this 
bias, selecting peers evenly from their desired torrents. 
Improving cover traffic. Users that are sensitive to their anonymity should ensure 
that the Marketplace is well stocked with items that are legitimate candidates for 
cover traffic. Such items would include sensitive, but highly-legal objects that provide 
better plausible deniability. 
This last point about cover traffic leads to interesting ethical questions about the 
Bit Torrent Anonymity Marketplace because it will, without a doubt, provide cover for 
individuals engaging in illegal and reprehensible behavior. Unfortunately, it is often 
the assumption that anonymity only benefits individuals engaging in such actions. 
The truth is that anonymity is valuable for many legitimate purposes. For example, 
• An individual with a medical condition may not wish to reveal it. Doing research 
on the internet can expose them to other parties. The BitTorrent Anonymity 
Marketplace does not provide anonymity for the initial search for documents (a 
standard service like Tor is well suited to this task), but could provide cover for 
downloading and viewing a video about treatment options. 
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• Legality is highly dependent on the jurisdiction. What may be legal in one 
region of the world may be highly illegal somewhere else. Such content may 
be sensitive to the downloader even if it is legal. This is especially true if the 
downloader is from, or has ties to, a jurisdiction where it is illegal. 
• Anonymity also protects individuals from commercial exploitation. In cases 
where BitTorrent is being used for legal content, corporations can easily learn 
a user's tastes and interests from very simple observations of the tracker or 
DHT. Absent regulations to the contrary, corporations will naturally begin using 
this information to target users with advertising and so forth. The BitTorrent 
Anonymity Marketplace significantly reduces the effectiveness of such attacks, 
since many or most of the nodes participating in any given torrent will be there 
for the cover-traffic, not because it's their native interest. In fact, they will have 
no idea what they're sharing. 
The effectiveness of the Marketplace is greatly increases when there are many 
kinds of legitimate, yet sensitive, torrents actively in trade. On the other hand, if 
only illegally copied music is found therein, it won't matter if you have /c-anonymous 
cover traffic. K illegal music or movie downloads is no better (and, in fact, could be 
worse) than just one. 
That said, there will be individuals that would be interested in using a service 
such as the BitTorrent Anonymity Marketplace to engage in illegal behavior. They 
should be aware that /c-traffic anonymity will probably not shield them effectively 
from government observation (see, e.g., You-are-not-a-lawyer [71]). It is possible, 
however, that the BitTorrent Anonymity Marketplace does help to cover users against 
corporate investigation. For corporations looking to bring lawsuits against individuals 
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based on downloads, the BitTorrent Anonymity Marketplace greatly increases the 
cost of determining infringement, and introduces a risk of false positive to the suing 
company. 
Can a user be held legally liable for downloading a torrent, as cover traffic, assum-
ing the content in question would be illegal to have downloaded via ordinary means? 
The essence of the user's defense would be that they were just helping random peers 
to download content, while they, themselves, were getting something entirely differ-
ent. Of course, if they are faced with all k of their encrypted downloads and asked to 
prove which one they can decrypt, they may be stuck. Furthermore, even if the user 
legitimately doesn't know what is being downloaded, the adversary might well crawl 
the various content discovery sites (e.g., PirateBay and the like), creating their own 
reverse-mapping from encrypted torrents to their true identities. 
As such, the degree of anonymity proffered by the BitTorrent Anonymity Mar-
ketplace seems to be comparable to serving as the exit node of Tor or another such 
onion-route system. The exit node is clearly observable doing fetching what could 
well be illegal content. The exit node's operator may well claim that the content in 
question was being delivered to a third party, but the exit node is clearly partici-
pating in the process. Of course, such arguments quickly become absurd. Internet 
core routers certainly have significant volumes of undesirable content transiting them 
every day, all day long. They might claim a "common carrier" defense if sued. Could 
a BitTorrent Anonymity Marketplace node, or for that matter a Tor exit node, claim 
a similar defense? 
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4.6.2 Informed Risk 
One possible development to the BitTorrent Anonymity Marketplace would be chan-
nels that inform the participant of risk. In particular, these third-parties would 
uncover the content names and descriptions for the opaque DHT identifiers. Users of 
these services could then fill their active sets with elements from white lists or pre-
vent elements from black lists from getting in. This would, of course, erase plausible 
deniability about not knowing the content. However, the user could choose their own 
level of risk. 
Most importantly users could be absolutely sure that morally, ethically, and legally 
unacceptably risky content, such as child pornography, would never pass through their 
systems. Users looking for anonymity for sensitive but legal content, such as medical 
treatment videos, could also ensure that they were not taking any legal risks for their 
behavior and might, instead, find themselves downloading medical videos for a wide 
variety of different ailments. Moreover, certain organizations that believe in civil 
disobedience to what they perceive as unjust laws might purposefully participate in 
providing cover traffic for certain classes of torrents. Curiously, the black list for one 
organization might be a white list for another. 
As a concrete example, consider a government that runs a black list of videos that 
are deemed illegal for whatever reason (e.g., criticism of the king is illegal). Citizens 
within that country that wish to have anonymity and avoid legal risk could use that 
list as a black list. Other individuals, inside or outside of the country, might treat 
that as a white list, looking to provide cover traffic for those torrents by making them 
more popular. 
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4.6.3 Future Work 
Several aspects of the BitTorrent Anonymity Marketplace remain unresolved or re-
quire further exploration. The aforementioned legal issues are one such area. It would 
be valuable to explore the legal possibilities of the BitTorrent Anonymity Marketplace 
under the laws of various jurisdictions. 
Another area of significant future research is the valuation function that each 
peer performs on the torrents it is trading. Just as we are not lawyers, we are 
also not economists. We recognize that the economic interactions of our proposed 
system are complicated but subtle. In a real world implementation, there might be 
thousands of torrents and hundreds of thousands of clients in the Marketplace, not 
to mention churn, disparities of upload and download capacities and so forth. It will 
be a daunting challenge to uncover a generalized valuation function that works well 
under all circumstances. 
Our current simulations are pedagogical and unrealistic. In particular, we have 
not studied the BitTorrent Anonymity Marketplace under realistic churn or other such 
conditions. Because our simulations lack these features, we have been unable to see 
some predicted behaviors that require them. Also, in a real-world scenario, torrents 
will be of different sizes and nodes would have widely varying network performance. 
Different nodes might have different values of A;-anonymity that they desire. It would 
be convenient if the choice of k value for a client had no impact on its neighbors, but 
we have not examined this. 
We have also not completely explored the attack space for either inquisitors or 
rational attackers. Our simulation does not yet include an active inquisitor that 
attempts to introduce tainted information in an effort to reveal the interests of peers. 
Similarly, our simulations do not yet include a rational manipulators that lies about 
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state in an effort to manipulate torrent values. 
Finally, it should be obvious that simulation alone is insufficient for evaluating the 
Bit Torrent Anonymity Marketplace. An actual implementation must be created and 
evaluated for real-world operations. A whole host of difficulties is involved in such 
development, although most of them are legal, rather than technical. 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this work, we have explored a new method for cooperative anonymity in BitTorrent 
swarms, called the BitTorrent Anonymity Marketplace, where peers exchange pieces 
of multiple torrents based on their value for trading with other peers. This creates 
a world where intent is difficult to discern because motivations are obscured by the 
shifting values within the local neighborhood. Nodes always download k different 
torrents, selected randomly, to completion, obscuring their true intent, yet still biased 
in favor of increasing the nodes' observed performance. 
With detailed event-based simulations, we demonstrated that the download be-
havior for native interests and cover traffic was statistically similar, making it difficult 
for observers to distinguish between the two. We also demonstrated in simulation that 
our Marketplace completes without unreasonable overhead beyond the cover traffic's 
costs. We also evaluated the incentives of our system and found that the overall 
setup is sound against rational manipulations, but that there are obvious places for 
exploitation. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
In this thesis, we have investigated one of the most difficult problems for peer-to-peer 
networks: preventing rational attacks through proper incentives design. Our results 
contribute to both the theory and practice of such design by elucidating attributes 
important to successful incentives and then using those principles in concrete imple-
mentations. Specifically, genuine incentives generally provide more effective rational 
robustness than their artificial counterparts. In fact, genuine incentives completely 
eliminate the auditing class of attacks that many artificial-incentives systems are 
subject to. Armed with this key observation, we implemented two extensions to the 
BitTorrent p2p protocol that improve performance and anonymity. Both extensions 
have the incentives built directly into the peer-interactions requiring no additional 
infrastructure for behavior enforcement. 
In this chapter we present our conclusions regarding genuine incentives given our 
experiences developing the two aforementioned extensions. This discussion excludes 
any analysis of the effectiveness of the extensions in achieving their designated ob-
jectives. Such analysis is already provided in their respective individual chapters. 
Instead, our conclusions in this final chapter are focused on how our understanding 
of genuine incentives has grown through the development of these extensions. 
In summary, our experiences have strengthened our belief in the superiority of gen-
uine incentives. We observed them to be simple in design and impervious to auditing 
attacks by definition. Those observations were not novel, but were reassuring. On the 
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other hand, in the development of our extensions, we also observed that a genuine 
incentives system was also easy to understand from a rational agent's perspective. 
In other words, the incentives system was so simple that the agent could easily be 
expected to understand the mechanism. This is critical to rational robustness as we 
will describe later in the chapter. 
5.1 Genuine Incentives: Simplicity 
When we began to approach the problem of adding incentives for seeding in Bit Tor-
rent, our first solution used an artificial incentives. The basic idea was for a node to 
seed in return for a cryptographically signed token from the receiver. In the future, 
if the nodes were to re-encounter one another, the previous seeder could "demand" 
service from the previous receiver by returning the tokens. Failure to honor these 
commitments would result in a negative reputation. We then began designing the 
system to allow for the trading of these tokens between peers to create a form of 
virtual currency. 
While the design is interesting, we quickly abandoned it for the sheer complexity 
of the mechanism. Consider these problems: 
1. Cross Trading Value - If cross trading of tokens is supported, so that a node 
trades tokens with another node, the purchasing node must have some belief 
that the tokens will be honored. Otherwise, they would have no value. This 
means that the purchaser must expect to encounter the tokens' signer in the 
future, or another node that is willing to purchase them. This would obviously 
be a probabilistic computation, but we could not easily identify factors that 
would influence the probabilities. 
2. Reputation - To adequately punish nodes that refused to honor their signed 
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tokens, the slighted node would have to convince peers to refuse to interact 
with the transgressor. This is complicated for two reasons. First, the method 
for accusing a node of breaking its word must deal with problems such as false 
accusations, and a number of other difficult issues. Second, the accuser must 
be able to reach a large number of peers in the BitTorrent swarm to be able to 
have any effect. In any event, even if the accuser can prove that another node 
is slighting it, other peers may choose to do business with it anyway because it 
has always been honest with them. 
This solution was discarded because of its overwhelming complexity in favor of the 
solution we implemented. While our genuine incentives approach has some non-trivial 
design concerns, the overall system is significantly simpler. 
Obviously, this is merely an anecdotal evidence, but it does illustrate typical 
problems encountered by artificial incentives. In general, artificial incentives require 
an additional enforcement protocol in addition to the cooperative protocol. This lack 
of protocol cohesion introduces extra complexity that makes implementation difficult 
and also more prone to rational attacks simply because the attack surface is larger. 
This is not to say that creating genuine incentives is easy. As we will describe 
later, genuine incentives require greater design time than artificial ones. 
5.2 Genuine Incentives: Impervious to Auditing Attacks 
The enforcement protocol common to artificial incentives system is often designed 
around an auditing mechanism of some type. In the original design we suggested for 
seeding incentives, the tokens issued by a node were cryptographically signed to be 
used as a form of evidence. In theory, unhonored tokens would be shown to other 
peers that would subsequently shun the offender. 
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Unfortunately, this relatively simple idea is complicated in practice. Consider a 
malicious node that falsely accuses a victim of refusing to honor its tokens. A properly 
designed crypto system provides a mechanism for the victim to refute the charges, 
but the victim is unable to trace all of the gossip, This means that nodes hearing the 
accusations would either have to trust them, or validate them directly. The latter 
option is costly because they must either stop their current operations to track down 
the accused node to determine guilt, or wait until they encounter the node in normal 
interactions then ask for refutation of all accusations received until that point. 
The problem with auditing attacks drives to the heart of the problem of artificial 
incentives. If the primary protocol can proceed without the enforcement protocol, 
than a rational attacker need only disable or disrupt the latter to misuse the former. 
On the other hand, genuine incentives generally forgo auditing altogether and 
this entire attack class disappears. Most systems of this type rely on first-hand 
information, throwing away all the complications of trust, reputation, and third-
party enforcement. Obviously, this reduction also introduces limitations that we will 
discuss later. 
5.3 Genuine Incentives: Bounded Rationality 
In our discussion thus far, we have modeled P2P nodes as rational agents. That 
means they know the rules of the game, and will use those rules to maximize their 
utility. 
In real life, however, most participants are not rational by these definitions, but 
are bounded rational. Bounded rational parties want to maximize their utility, but 
either do not know the full rules of the game, or have insufficient resources to play 
the maximizing strategy. Restated, even if an incentives system is designed such that 
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obedience is the utility maximizing strategy, participants may choose a different strat-
egy because they do not know better or because obedience requires more resources 
than they have available. 
Consider for example an artificial incentives system with an auditing component. 
Even if the auditing mechanism is impervious to attack, if the system is sufficiently 
complicated, rational attackers may believe that the mechanism can be circumvented. 
The result may be that the attackers play sub-optimal strategies to their own detri-
ment, but also to the detriment of the entire system. 
Genuine incentives, however, are simple and easy-to-understand and difficult or 
expensive to abuse. For example, it has been shown that BitTorrent is imminently 
abusable, yet it has been one of the most stable p2p systems to date. Despite all of the 
known methods for exploiting BitTorrent, enough nodes continue to cooperate to keep 
the system viable. We believe this is partially because the trading mechanism is easy 
to understand and easy to follow, while the exploits are complicated to understand 
or have a high barrier for entry such as a non-standard or unpopular client. 
Bounded rationality is probably the strongest reason to choose genuine over arti-
ficial incentives. Even if artificial incentives are robust and stable, their complexity 
may still result in bounded rational participants being disobedient. Conversely, a 
genuine incentive with provable vulnerabilities might still be more effective if the 
incentive is easy and vulnerabilities are hard. 
5.4 Genuine Incentives: Limitations 
Despite the various advantages of genuine incentives, we have identified two limita-
tions designers must account for. 
First, genuine incentives require a greater design time. While they are generally 
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more simple in implementation, the incentive itself is often difficult to identify. Cre-
ating a genuine incentive requires tying incentives and resource-exchange together. 
The implementation of such an entanglement is relatively simple, but discovering the 
entanglement is difficult and time consuming. 
Second, there is no free lunch. Genuine incentives cannot be optimal for all pos-
sible p2p problems. They are, by definition, limited to influencing behaviors tied to 
resource exchange. While this may sound obvious, consider the following two com-
mon uses of artificial incentives for which there are no genuine equivalents. First, 
artificial incentives can be, and are often, used to enable transitive cooperation. This 
enables nodes that have not encountered one another before to not have to start from 
scratch in their cooperative relationship because of some transitive relationship. Sec-
ond, punishments from artificial incentives can include the excommunication of the 
offender from the swarm. This means that a wider variety of bad behaviors can be 
penalized because the penalty is not just tied to performance. 
These were issues we dealt with in the process of developing our own extensions. 
Because we made the conscious choice of exclusively using genuine incentives, we had 
to design around these limitations. 
5.5 Genuine Incentives: Future Work and the Final Word 
The concept of a genuine versus artificial incentive is entirely novel and an important 
contribution to p2p design theory. In this work we have investigated the nature 
of genuine incentives through survey and experimentation. In doing so, we have 
illuminated the concept and demonstrated that it is a useful design principle. We feel 
this justifies future research and propose the following questions as starting points. 
Can the definition of genuine incentives be formalized? We have used a loose 
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and informal definition of genuine and artificial incentives throughout this work. It 
has been useful as a design principle and a method of classifying systems. Moreover, 
it has helped provide useful insight. Nevertheless, the next step is to formalize its 
definition and clearly identify its characteristics and limitations. 
Can we formally prove that genuine incentives are more robust than artificial 
ones? Our assertions about the value of genuine incentives are based on experience, 
surveys, and reasoning. Obviously, any incentive that does not use auditing is not 
subject to auditing attacks, but this is not the salient point. If we succeeded in 
creating a formal definition of genuine incentive, then perhaps we could subsequently 
investigate a formal model of its robustness. 
How can artificial incentives be designed to bolster genuine incentives? Given that 
all behaviors cannot be genuinely incentivized, artificial incentives may often need to 
be added to a genuine incentives system. However, it is not clear if a p2p system 
would benefit from the two systems designed to inter-operate as opposed to simply 
co-existing. 
Breaking the limitations of genuine incentives Although we found it difficult to use 
genuine incentives beyond direct-contact peers, we have no proof that such incentives 
do not exist. Genuine incentives of this form could greatly expand the robustness 
of many p2p systems. Such a solution would have to tie the transfer of cooperation 
into the direct transfer of resources. We also identified excommunication of a node 
as something tied to artificial incentives. Uncovering a genuine incentives method of 
kicking a node out of a system would also be beneficial to p2p systems. 
Having identified these avenues for further investigation, we conclude this thesis 
by restating our fundamental contribution. In this work we have identified an im-
portant class of incentives in p2p systems: genuine incentives. In surveys of existing 
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systems we identified the strength of these incentives versus their artificial counter-
parts. We then used this observation to create two extensions to BitTorrent based 
on genuine incentives. In this endeavor, we strengthened our understanding of how 
this type of incentive works, as well as what its limitations are. More importantly, 
we demonstrated that this concept was useful in the design of practical p2p systems. 
Our extensions solved unrelated problems, but in both cases, the guiding design goal 
was to use a genuine incentive and the results were effective and interesting. We hope 
that this research aides in the development of future p2p computing by improving 
incentives design. 
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